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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article applies a new paradigm from the field of computer science—
inconsistency robustness (IR)—in order to analyze the competing ways in which 
the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit craft patent law standards and rules. The 
IR paradigm is a shift from the previous paradigm of inconsistency elimination. 
The new IR paradigm recognizes that modern, complex information systems must 
perform notwithstanding persistent and continuous inconsistencies. The focus on 
IR encourages system designers to recognize the reality of persistent 
inconsistency when building robust systems that can perform reliably. Legal 
systems regularly process a great deal of complexity and inconsistency, and thus, 
by necessity, have always been structured to be inconsistency robust. 
Accordingly, applying insights from the formal IR paradigm is helpful in 
analyzing the effective functioning of legal systems.  
This Article is the first legal article to formally utilize IR in analyzing the 
legal system. By using IR analysis, the article identifies and analyzes a previously 
under analyzed persistent pattern within patent law. Specifically, the article 
shows via example in five separate areas of patent law that the Federal Circuit 
and Supreme Court repeatedly diverge on the adoption of rules versus standards 
in patent law. The Article shows that this pattern can be explained by viewing the 
two courts as rational systems administrators attempting to maintain an 
inconsistency robust patent system from each of their perspectives as systems 
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administrators. The Article further shows that if the courts adopt a holistic view 
of IR, they can craft more optimal patent law by taking into account the costs and 
benefits of the law to all participants and administrators of the patent law system. 
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I. Introduction 
This Article applies a new paradigm from the field of computer 
science—Inconsistency Robustness (IR)—in order to analyze the contrasting 
ways in which the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit craft patent law standards 
and rules. The inconsistency robustness paradigm is a shift from the previous 
computer science paradigms of inconsistency denial and inconsistency 
elimination. The new IR paradigm recognizes that modern, complex information 
systems must perform notwithstanding persistent and continuous inconsistencies. 
The focus on inconsistency robustness encourages system designers to recognize 
the reality of persistent inconsistency when building robust systems that can 
perform reliably. Using insights from the IR paradigm, this Article analyzes a 
significant difference in the approaches of the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit to crafting the patent law system. By analyzing five separate areas of 
patent law, this Article examines the clear trend, when it comes to patent law, of 
the Federal Circuit to prefer bright-line rules, while the Supreme Court 
repeatedly overturns those rules in favor of more flexible, contextual standards. 
This Article explores several possible explanations for this phenomenon, 
including explanations based on the differing mandates and roles that the legal 
system gives the two courts, relative expertise, and potential “capture” of the 
Federal Circuit by the patent community.  
While each of these explanations may have some merit, we ultimately 
conclude that much of the divergence derives from the fact that the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court both function as sophisticated “system designers” 
that consciously try to design and adjust the patent law system so as to have 
optimal inconsistency robustness in terms of costs and benefits both to those 
affected by patent law and the court system itself. This Article shows that when 
analyzed within the inconsistency robustness paradigm, the costs and benefits to 
flexible standards as opposed to bright-line rules vary considerably between the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court. Accordingly, a system design that the 
Supreme Court considers to be efficient and inconsistency robust turns out to be 
inefficient and non-robust from the point of view of the Federal Circuit. In sum, 
both courts are sophisticated actors with knowledge of the tradeoffs between 
rules and standards, but, because they bear the costs and benefits of rules versus 
standards differently, and because of the fact that they perceive these costs and 
benefits to be borne differently by those affected by their decisions, they adopt 
divergent strategies to frame the patent system. We believe that recognition of 
the validity of this analysis can lead these two courts to pursue a more uniform 
system design tactic and, thus, decrease the level of uncertainty in patent law. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the new paradigm of 
inconsistency robustness, surveying the nascent literature in the field and 
discussing the courts from within the paradigm of inconsistency robustness. Part 
II shows that courts, by necessity, have built inconsistency robust systems for 
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millennia. This part also shows the types of error and inconsistency present in 
legal systems that must be weighed and balanced. Part III analyzes six areas of 
patent law that highlight the divergent strategies adopted by the Federal Circuit 
and the Supreme Court when dealing with inconsistency present in the legal 
system. Part IV discusses possible explanations for the differing strategies. It also 
analyzes the divergent approaches of the two courts from the inconsistency 
robustness paradigm and provides significant evidence to conclude that that the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court weigh the costs and benefits of rules 
versus standard differently when it comes to patent law. Part V discusses what 
the two courts can learn about patent law from their respective positions on 
inconsistency robustness. The Article concludes in Part VI.  
II. Inconsistency Robustness 
Inconsistency robustness is a paradigm shift in thinking about 
information system performance. Before examining how the inconsistency 
robustness paradigm is changing thinking about information systems, however, it 
is worthwhile to define the term “system” as is generally used in the study of 
systems, which is how we will use the term in this Article. 
A “system” is a set of components and relationships that are different 
from components or relationships of other sets.
1
 In many ways, categorizing a set 
of components and relationships as a system is an exercise in boundary 
determination.
2
 Once a system has been characterized, studies of the system may 
attempt to determine abstract properties, concepts, and principles that may be 
applicable to systems more generally.
3
 Fields that study the properties of systems 
include systems theory, cybernetics, dynamical systems, and complex systems.
4
 
Inconsistency robustness recognizes that modern, complex information 
systems must perform notwithstanding persistent and continuous 
inconsistencies.
5
 The focus on inconsistency robustness encourages designers and 
administrators to recognize the reality of persistent inconsistency when building 
robust systems that can perform reliably.
6
 The focus on inconsistency robustness 
 
1
 NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS: OR THE CONTROL AND 
COMMUNICATION IN THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (1948); KENNETH D. 
BAILEY, SOCIOLOGY AND THE NEW SYSTEMS THEORY: TOWARD A THEORETICAL 
SYNTHESIS (1994). 
2
 See Bailey, supra note 1. 
3
 ROSS ASHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS (1956). 
4
 See Bailey, supra note 1. 
5
 Carl Hewitt, Common Sense for Inconsistency-robust Information 
Integration Using Direct Logic
TM 
Reasoning and the Actor Model, available at 
http://arxiv.org/abs/0812.4852, August 2011, at 6. 
6
 Id. 
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is a shift from the previous dominant paradigm that sought to solve 
inconsistencies via inconsistency denial or inconsistency elimination.
7
 
The term “inconsistency robustness” was coined in recent years by Carl 
Hewitt
8
, founder of the International Society of Inconsistency Robustness. This 
society promotes the study of information systems, such as computer programs, 
ecosystems, and management systems that process ever growing inconsistent 
information. The goal is to understand how these systems operate reliably while 
being “bombarded” by inconsistent information and use that knowledge to 
improve other systems’ performance. This knowledge is the science of 
“inconsistency robustness.”9 
Because inconsistency robustness is a new paradigm, the literature about 
it is only beginning to develop. The primary published resource at this point is 
the refereed proceedings of Inconsistency Robustness 2011 published online. 
Thus, we think it is useful to further explore our understanding of the paradigm at 
the outset of this Article. We understand the inconsistency robustness paradigm 
to situate a system designer so that she operates with a mindfulness of the costs 
and benefits of reducing inconsistencies within an information processing 
system.
10
 In other words, we understand the inconsistency robustness paradigm 
as a “reminder” to a system designer that the ultimate goal is not inconsistency 
elimination per se, but rather a cost efficient inconsistency circumvention.
11
 This 
means that the system designer knows that creating an inconsistency-free legal 
 
7
 Id. 
8
 Carl Hewitt is Board Chair of the International Society for Inconsistency 
Robustness. He has been a Visiting Professor at Stanford University and the 
University of Keio. In 2000, he became emeritus in the EECS department at 
MIT; see http://carlhewitt.info/  
9 
See http://www.isir.ws/ 
10
 Of course, discovering what are the costs and benefits of inconsistency 
reduction or management can be a difficult, and may occur gradually, as they are 
uncovered, and in some cases, negotiated among the participants. See, e.g., 
Edwina L. Rissland, AI and Similarity, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, May/June 
2006, at 42 (“[T]he study of flexible, slippery concepts has great potential for 
shedding light on how we think and how to build robust systems capable of 
dealing with the evolving, messy world we and our systems need to thrive in.”). 
11
 See also Edwina L. Rissland, Black Swans, Gray Cygnets and Other Rare 
Birds, CASE-BASED REASONING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 2009, at 6 
(arguing that it is important to understand novel, although not necessarily 
unforeseen cases, when building an intelligent system that is not only robust in 
changing and challenging contexts but that can also be pro-active in such 
domains). 
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system is a quite unrealistic task,
12
 and that sometimes even attempting just to 
reduce inconsistency may not be worth the costs entailed.
13
 Consequently, a 
system designer working within the inconsistency robustness paradigm strives to 
manage inconsistency with a significant appreciation for the costs and benefits of 
reducing particular inconsistencies, i.e. with a significant appreciation for the 
value of designing a system so as to be robust in the face of inconsistency that is 
not able to be reduced, or not worth the cost of reduction.  
Inconsistency Robustness Theory tells us that systems characterized by 
the presence of pervasive inconsistency should be designed in a way that allows 
effective operation notwithstanding that inconsistency. This means that designers 
and administrators of complex systems should focus on identifying the best way 
to make the system—together with its inconsistency—run effectively, rather than 
investing resources in inconsistency elimination, which can never be even 
partially attained for large systems. This is because on one hand complete 
inconsistency elimination is impossible, and on the other, significant 
inefficiencies both in the form of higher costs or additional inconsistency can 
derive from merely attempting inconsistency reduction. Thus, IR promotes an 
approach that is, ultimately, able to improve the overall system’s performance. 
A. Use of Inconsistency Robustness in Computer Science 
The operation of computer information systems is a clear example of the 
benefits produced by IR adoption.
14
 Computer information systems are 
characterized by the presence of significant inconsistency; yet they operate 
effectively. The reason for this result is that computer scientists have learned to 
work with the many inconsistencies present by using inconsistency robust 
reasoning that allows them to accomplish that task in an efficacious way.
15
 
Clearly, the inconsistency robustness concept acquired great significance 
with the emergence of computer science. However its origin can be traced back 
to Wittgenstein’s work on mathematics and his critique of Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem.
16
 At the beginning of the twentieth century Gödel 
showed that there are fundamental limitations to what statements can be proved 
 
12
 AI and Similarity, supra note 10 at 44 (“Instead of trying to cure [the open-
textured, nonstationary, nonconvex nature of their concepts], perhaps we should 
simply embrace the fact that they’re open-textured ‘all the way down’ so to 
speak—that the one constant is change, and exceptions aren’t exceptional.”). 
13
 “Inconsistency” in terms of information systems generally refers to holding 
both a proposition and its negation. Thus “inconsistency” includes mistakes and 
“bugs.” See Carl Hewitt supra note 5. 
14
 See Carl Hewitt supra note 5 at 38. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. at 37. 
IR 3-27.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/29/2012  4:17 PM 
201x]  107 
or disproved within a formal system; thus, he produced a theory of 
incompleteness within such systems.
17
 However, Wittgenstein criticized 
significantly Gödel’s theory because it made use of self-referential propositions, 
thus, leading to inconsistency.
18
 The value of Wittgenstein’s work on 
mathematics was recognized only recently.
19
 
One of the areas in which the application of IR has produced useful 
results is active learning where machine-learning algorithms are studied.
20
 The 
idea is that a learning algorithm can perform tasks such as speech recognition, 
information extraction and classification and filtering better and with less training 
than other algorithms.
21
 Thus, it can provide better and less costly email filtering, 
movie recommendations, personalized restaurant ratings, etc. The adoption of IR 
in this area has changed significantly the way in which outliers—data points 
inconsistent with what the algorithm has already learned
22—are treated.23 
Typically, outliers are ignored because, given a certain model that is reasonably 
accurate for most of the points, they are considered to misinform and lead the 
learning process astray.
24
 However, based on IR, it has been recently shown that 
outliers can be highly informative during the early learning stage because, for 
instance, they allow for a quicker model selection and optimization of the 
model’s parameters.25 Thus, a new active learning framework has been proposed 
that utilizes outlier detection methods.
26
 This framework outperforms 
frameworks adopting traditional active learning methods in a number of 
settings.
27
 
How are “outliers,” such as inconsistent or erroneous decisions, treated 
within the legal system? Are they ignored, eliminated or managed? Is it possible 
 
17
 Francesco Berto, There’s Something About Godel: The Complete Guide to 
the Incompleteness Theorem, Wiley-Blackwell (2009); Rebecca Goldstein, 
Incompleteness: the proof and paradox of Kurt Gödel, W. W. Norton (2005). For 
history of mathematics see also Victor J. Katz, A History of Mathematics, 
Adison-Wesley (1998). 
18
 See Francesco Berto supra note 17, Carl Hewitt supra note 5 at 37. 
19
 Id. at 38. 
20 
Burr Settles, Curious Machines: Active Learning with Structured Instances 
2, 3 (2008) available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~bsettles/pub/settles.thesis.pdf 
21 
Id. 
22 
Neil Rubens, Toshio Okamoto, Active Learning by Outlier Detection 
(2011) 
23 
Id. 
24 
Id. 
25 
Id. 
26 
Id. 
27 
Id. 
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to use this knowledge to improve the overall legal system’s performance? These 
are key questions for IR that shows that that “properly taking into account 
inconsistent data can positively affect systems’ performance.”28 Thus, the 
remaining parts of this paper use IR to address these issues and, specifically, to 
provide an IR analysis of the divergent approach to rules versus standards by the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in patent law. 
B. Inconsistency Robustness and the U.S. Legal System 
While inconsistency robustness has great applicability to computing and 
information systems design and operation, it is also applicable to information 
processing systems generally. And indeed, many complex systems have been 
practicing some form of inconsistency robustness for centuries, even if they did 
not use the terminology.
29
  
One such complex system that must deal with inconsistency is a legal 
system. Of course, in this later case one cannot speak in the same precise terms in 
which one describes inconsistency in mathematical or computing systems. 
Indeed, the legal “code” is not as precise as computer programming codes, 
because it is written in prose, which is inherently more nuanced, and therefore 
more open to multiple interpretations.
30
 Also, the application of legal code to the 
multivariate affairs of humans gives even more complexity to the inconsistency 
robustness analysis. 
Court systems, like complex computer systems, constantly face questions 
as to what is the state of things, or what is the correctness of a contention. Courts 
also face legal questions as to which of a number of competing legal rules could 
apply in a given situation. Often, the policies underlying the competing legal 
 
28 
Id. 
29
 See generally Michel Cotsaftis, A Passage to Complex Systems, in 
COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND SELF-ORGANIZATION MODELLING 3, 3-4 (Kelso, J.A. 
Scott et al., ed. 2009)  (describing the evolution of system studies ranging from 
simple systems through complex systems where “Now ways have to be 
developed for proper analysis of their dynamics which do not come out from just 
addition of the ones of their components and the research of final system 
behavior is, due to importance of nonlinearities, generally outside the range of 
application of classical methods.”) 
30
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 315 (2006) (“These questions are 
not addressed by any clear constitutional text or tradition, but they are also cases 
of latent ambiguity. There is no ‘answer’ to them in the sense of a judgment that 
seems to have been made and that a court can simply report.  An answer must be 
fixed upon, not found; made, not discovered; chosen, not reported.”).  
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rules are inconsistent with each other and pull the court in different directions.
31
 
Consequently, courts work in contexts in which significant inconsistency is 
present,
32
 and in which decisions about inconsistency reduction and 
inconsistency robustness are fundamental to the proper operation of the overall 
system.  
Specifically, courts must deal both with error correction and with 
inconsistency. By error correction, we mean the management of manifest error 
that courts make both in terms of the determination of facts and the interpretation 
and application of law. Correcting errors, or getting decisions “right,” is an 
important value of any court system; it is a substantial part of what we call 
justice.
33
 A system designer thus has an interest in a correct interpretation of facts 
and law, i.e. has an interest in managing manifest errors.  At the same time, being 
treated equally before the law is also an essential part of what we call justice.
34
 
 
31
 See, e.g., Michael LeBoff, A Need for Uniformity: Survivorship Under 42 
U.S.C. §1983, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 221, 221-222 (1998) (Courts unable to 
determine which laws should apply regarding § 1983 recovery due to 
inconsistent policies demonstrate inconsistent and inequitable recoveries 
throughout the United States.). (“Currently, state and federal courts borrow the 
survival statute of the state in which the court sits, unless 
that law is inconsistent with the policies of compensation and deterrence which 
underlie § 1983. This has led to inconsistent and inequitable recoveries 
throughout the United States.
 
Therefore, courts need to create a uniform rule of 
survivorship to ensure fairness and equity.”). 
32
 See Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a 
Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 291, 325 (2003) 
(“Courts decide rather arbitrarily which factors to employ and, without 
articulated interpretative frameworks to guide their decisions, courts oscillate 
between different versions of the factors, resulting in inconsistencies within 
circuits…Critics liken litigation of joint employer cases to ‘legal Russian 
roulette.’”). 
33
 There are many competing notions of what is justice and thus what are the 
legal standards that promote justice. Any opinion on theories of justice is beyond 
the scope of this Article. But whatever notion of justice one adopts, one wants 
courts to get decisions correct. To get it wrong obviously does not promote 
justice.  
34
 Louise Arbour, Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition, 40 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 5 n. 10  (2007) (“Substantive equality is important 
to social justice, as equality with no qualification may be misinterpreted as 
formal equality or equality of opportunities only.”); N.J. Schweitzer, et al., Rule 
Violations and the Rule of Law: A Factorial Survey of Public Attitudes, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV., 615, 623 (2007) (citing T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW LIBERTY, AND 
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Consequently, a system designer has an interest in pursuing equality too, i.e. has 
an interest in managing inconsistency even when it is the result of courts’ error 
management. Indeed, as discussed in the next part, manifest error and 
inconsistency are sometimes byproducts of the different strategies that courts, 
and particularly higher courts, adopt to achieve increased justice, and at times can 
be negatively correlated.
 35
 
To manage errors, the American court system utilizes an intricate scheme 
of complex rules aimed at providing reliable information to judges and juries to 
help them achieving a better determination of what are the relevant facts of a 
particular case. Entire courses in law school are devoted to this system so that 
attorneys will be trained in their roles and able to aid courts in this task.
36
 The 
American court system also has an intricate scheme for adjudicating legal 
questions in the form of equally complex rules for construing legal statutes and 
applying the law to cases. This system is also the subject of numerous courses, 
and portions of courses, in law schools.
37
 Indeed, teaching this intricate scheme 
makes up most of what is meant when law schools say that they teach students to 
“think like lawyers.”38 
 
JUSTICE: THE LEGAL  FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 22 (1993,  
(“Professor T.R.S. Allan has echoed Scalia’s belief that equality and consistency 
are necessary conditions for justice.”); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance 
in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1085 (2008) (“Neutrality 
and equality of treatment have likewise been offered in more theoretical terms by 
legal scholars as important components of procedural justice, and are well-
represented in legal doctrine.”) 
35
 Cf. ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
APPROACH TO LEGAL REASONING 20 (L. Thorne McCarty et al. eds., 1987) 
(“[O]n a view of law as fixed rules with deductive consequences, there is no 
room for asking whether a valid deduction leads to an unjust conclusion.”). 
36
 Courses include civil procedure, evidence, legal ethics, and trial practice. 
Curriculum Guide – Boston College, 
http://www.bc.edu/content/bc/schools/law/services/academic/programs/curriculu
m/guide.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
37
 Courses include civil procedure, administrative law, federal courts, and 
significant portions of the first year curriculum. Id.  
38
 JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING LEGAL REASONING: BRIEFING, ANALYSIS AND 
THEORY 10 (2006) (“In developing these basic skills, am I learning to read, think, 
talk and write like a lawyer? ... this is the dominant professorial priority in the 
first year of law school…If, over a period of time, you develop and internalize 
these basic skills…you’ll use some of these skills each day you work as a 
lawyer.”); Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Enough?, 17 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 583, 587 (1998) (“Anyone who has attended law school 
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Notwithstanding this elaborate design, the endless variety of ways in 
which people get into disputes and the complexities of deciding legal cases 
combine to result in trial courts getting both factual and legal questions incorrect 
with regularity. Consequently, the system has federal courts of appeal and the 
Supreme Court for the purpose of correcting these errors and promoting a proper 
application of the law by trial courts.
39
 Indeed, as previously mentioned, for the 
rule of law to be just and equitable, citizens should be able to expect consistent, 
fair, and accurate treatment in the courts.
40
 
The higher courts do not seek complete error elimination in lower court 
decisions, however, especially on factual issues.
41
 Nor does the system attempt 
complete equality of treatment across different courts.
42
 As one example, it is not 
uncommon for some courts to develop reputations as venues within which 
defendants, or plaintiffs, or even patent owners, may have a better chance of 
 
will recognize Llewellyn’s description. The not-so-hidden message that law 
professors give to their students is that to be a lawyer one must “think like a 
lawyer,” even if that means suppressing one’s compassion, idealism, and concern 
for truth and justice.”), 
39
 Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-
Century Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 459, 462 (2009) (“The purpose, indeed 
the only purpose, of those responsible for creating the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals was to provide a system of public accountability for federal 
trial judges; it was only for that reason that Congress established appellate courts 
whose job, indeed whose only job, would be not only to correct judges’ errors but 
to affirm and support their contested decisions.”); Charles S. Chapel, The Irony 
of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 501, 514 (1998) (“The traditional view is 
that appellate courts serve two purposes: (1) error review and correction, and (2) 
development of the law.
73
 If our appellate courts are to fulfill their error review 
and law development purposes and to maintain their systemic integrity, they 
must correct serious errors found on appeal.”). 
40
 Meir Katz, Plainly Not “Error”: Adjudicative Retroactivity on Direct 
Review, 25 CARDOZO, L. REV. 1979, 1991 n.74 (2004) (“ Equality’s fundamental 
importance to law—specifically, its command that like cases be treated alike--
cannot be overstated.”). 
41
 Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human But Not Always Harmless: When 
Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1169-70 (1995) 
(“Under [the harmless error doctrine], when an appellate court’s review of trial 
proceedings uncovers a legal error that might produce a disfavored result (such as 
the retrial of a defendant who appears to be guilty), the court may simply call the 
error “harmless,” and the potential aggravation is removed”); [Frase, n. 47; 
Hoffstadt, n. 44]. 
42
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success in their cases than other places.
43
 Thus, we see that rather than attempting 
to eliminate all error and inconsistency, the system has developed in a way that 
shows substantial inconsistency robustness. The court system openly accepts the 
presence of a certain amount of error and inconsistency.
44
 This is quite sensible, 
and is an example of an intuitively inconsistency robust view within the judicial 
system.  
If higher courts wanted to attempt correction of all potential factual 
errors, the higher courts would need to reevaluate the factual issues with the same 
richness of information available to the trial court—including the ability to 
observe witness demeanor.
45
 Reviewing courts would virtually have to retry the 
 
43
 William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal 
Considerations from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 REV. LITIG. 729, 
782 (2010) (“So-called ‘rocket dockets’ like the Eastern District of Virginia, the 
Eastern District of Texas, and the Western District of Wisconsin have been 
favored venues for plaintiffs in a hurry”). Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum 
Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases: Marshall’s Response to TS Tech 
and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 61, 62 (2010) (“As plaintiffs strive to 
choose the forum most favorable to their case, several federal district courts have 
become patent litigation “hotbeds.” Some emerged because of their reputation as 
“rocket dockets,” and the most notable hotbed, due to a variety of factors, 
explained infra, is the Eastern District of Texas”). Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants 
and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern 
District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 193 (2007) (“Plaintiff patent holders and their attorneys love the Eastern 
District of Texas. There are three key factors that make Marshall such an 
attractive forum: 1) knowledgeable judges experienced in patent cases; 2) special 
patent rules that compel open discovery with tight deadlines to which the judges 
strictly adhere, resulting in quick and relatively inexpensive trials; and 3) 
plaintiff-friendly juries.”) 
44
 Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 561, 577 (2001) (“These extensive judicial review mechanisms 
do not catch all errors, however. Despite the generally high quality of the federal 
bench and counsel in federal court, people are people and mistakes sometimes go 
undetected or uncorrected. Having a nonjudicial mechanism 
to correct some errors that the judicial system missed has logical appeal for the 
same reason that it makes sense to have appellate courts review errors allegedly 
committed by trial courts: each authority has a different perspective and 
sensitivities that make it likely to catch errors missed by the other.”).  
45
  Honorable James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 
903, 919 n. 72 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir. 1946)) 
(“The court correctly observed that the jury, despite the plaintiff’s “fantastic” 
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case. This would obviously be very expensive and time consuming. Instead of 
going to these lengths, appellate courts give deference to trial courts on issues of 
fact, and only overturn the lower courts when clear error or abuse of discretion 
has occurred.
46
 This allows some errors and inconsistencies to go unresolved, and 
thus may result in some litigants unfairly having their cases resolved based on 
mistaken understandings of the facts. But rather than seeking perfectly fair 
treatment of litigants by attempting perfect error correction and inconsistency 
elimination, the system is designed with knowledge that some error and 
inconsistency is inefficient to correct.
47
 In this way, one might say that the 
judicial system seeks robustness in the face of known error and inconsistencies.  
On the other hand, the courts of appeal and Supreme Court strive to 
reduce a good deal of inconsistency in legal issues. Courts are less concerned 
about the effect of some factual error and inconsistency on the parties of an 
individual case than they are about the erroneous and/or inconsistent application 
of law across numerous cases.
48
 For this reason, courts seek to correct more error 
 
story, must have an opportunity toobserve the witnesses’ demeanor to ascertain 
truthfulness.”);  
46
 William T. Stone, Jr., Waiving Good-Bye to Inconsistency: Factual Basis 
Challenges to Guilty Pleas in Federal Courts, 45 GA. L. REV. 311, 339 (2010). 
(“Some courts, however, adopt an abuse of discretion standard. While an abuse 
of discretion standard is arguably better than a de novo review in this context 
since district judges are exercising a degree of discretion in determining whether 
to accept a plea, abuse of discretion applies to context specific issues like the 
admission or exclusion of evidence rather than factual determinations. Therefore, 
review for clear error constitutes the proper amount of deference to the trial 
court’s factual determinations if appellate courts decide to conduct a factual basis 
review.”) 
47
 Richard S. Frase, The Search for the Whole Truth About American and 
European Criminal Justice Trials Without Truth: Why Our System of Criminal 
Trials has Become an Expensive Failure and What We Need to do to Rebuild It, 3 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.785, 840 (2000) (“That is because appellate courts make 
liberal use of the doctrine of “harmless error,” which allows certain trial errors 
(particularly decisions erroneously admitting some item of prosecution evidence) 
to be overlooked if the case is so strong that the error was unlikely to have 
affected the outcome.”). 
48
 John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 530 (2010) (“In most federal statutory cases, the 
Supreme Court follows a rather simple rule in deciding whether 
to grant certiorari in the case: the Court waits until the courts of appeals have 
reached inconsistent results in the interpretation and application of the 
federal law.”). 
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when it comes to legal questions,
49
 and to correct it at a higher level, so that a 
correct rule can then be applied consistently vertically, down to the trial courts, 
and horizontally, across numerous trial courts and appellate courts, if applicable. 
Thus, we see greater attempts at correcting errors and eliminating inconsistency 
for legal issues.
50
 More specifically, we see that the legal system designers have 
made important determinations about when to try to decrease error and 
inconsistency, and when to attempt robust operations in the face of error and 
inconsistency, by weighing the benefits of contemplated error correction or 
inconsistency reduction against the attendant costs of achieving this result.  
The legal system is designed so that it is good at getting to the point of 
action (decision) in the face of inconsistency. The rules and standards on how to 
proceed in the face of inconsistency reflect the overall goals and values of the 
system. These rules are designed to create a system that finds truth where it is 
efficient to do so, corrects error where that is efficient, and above all proceeds to 
decision, even in the face of inconsistency and error.
51
 One example of many, is 
that while errors may be reversed by a reviewing court, in the case of “harmless 
error” a court will uphold a decision even in the presence of acknowledged error, 
so long as that error is judged to be irrelevant to the outcome of the case.
52
   
The judicial system also sometimes adopts inconsistency robustness 
strategies in one area so as to decrease inconsistency in another area. For 
example, higher courts sometimes apply the judicial principle of stare decisis as 
a justification for forbearing the correction of a legal standard that is well 
established.
53
 The principle of stare decisis does not counsel courts never to 
 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Indeed, getting to a point of official and authoritative judgment is another 
primary feature of legal systems. Such judgments give litigants a decision from 
an authority, and reduce private conflict and even violence that would exist in the 
absence of the ability to litigate disputes. Justice Evelyn Keyes, The Literary 
Judge: The Judge as Novelist and Critic, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 679,  682 (2007) 
(“The purpose of legal judgment is to resolve particular cases in accordance with 
the law and the facts to determine the legal rights and duties of the 
individual litigantsunder the applicable legal principles; hence, to do justice to 
the litigants in the case and to provide a principled and coherent guide for 
future litigants in similar circumstances.”). 
52
 See Frase, supra note 47. 
53
 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and 
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 654 
(2001) (“[A] court’s decision to apply a relaxed doctrine of stare decisis and 
its decision to follow or discard a particular precedent. A court may decide that it 
is appropriate to relax the doctrine of stare decisis, but nonetheless conclude that 
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overturn well-established legal rules, but instead the principle encourages courts 
to be hesitant to overturn such rules absent compelling reasons.
54
 Stare decisis is 
thus very much within the inconsistency robustness paradigm. It warns against 
too great a willingness to frequently change the law in an attempt to achieve a 
“correct” standard, because, it may lead to the risk of creating additional 
inconsistency and error in subsequent lower courts’ decisions as they struggle 
with the shifting legal standards, or may cause problems for parties who relied on 
the established rule.
55
 Thus, stare decisis eschews elimination of some manifest 
error in order to promote robust horizontal and vertical consistency.  
 
a particular precedent should be followed either because it is correct or because it 
is not clearly incorrect.”)  
54
 See William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of 
Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of 
Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 54 (2002). (“Champions of 
stare decisis make several arguments on its behalf: (1) stare decisis serves to 
legitimize judicial institutions, because by adhering to precedent, in all but the 
rarest of circumstances, courts not only show deference to their predecessors but 
also give weight to current decisions because the citizenry recognizes the lasting 
impact these decisions will have; (2) stare decisis promotes judicial economy by 
allowing courts to reduce caseloads and creates disincentives to relitigation of 
precedent cases; (3) stare decisis allows for predictability because individuals are 
able to conform their behavior to a certain set of guidelines, and in return they are 
rewarded with the knowledge that this behavior, in line with the judicial 
determination, will be protected under law.”). 
55
 See In re Tarczy-Hornoch,55 C.C.P.A. 1441, 1459 (1968) (“I think that it 
takes much more than the discovery of a possible flaw in the reasoning of a court 
of years ago, which may or may not have misunderstood the purport of  earlier 
decisions, to overturn a well established and accepted rule of nearly seventy 
years’ standing.”); Bradstreet v. Thomas, 37 U.S. 59, 64 (1838) (“The principle 
on which this averment has been required is purely technical. But the rule has 
been established by the decisions of this Court, and we do not mean to disturb 
it”).  See also Edwina L. Rissland et al., AI and Law: A Fruitful Synergy, 150 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, 1, 3 (November 2003) (“Stare decisis requires that 
similar cases be decided similarly. While this doctrine puts the focus squarely on 
reasoning from case to case, it is silent on how “similarity” should be 
determined. In fact, similarity is not static; it can depend on one’s viewpoint and 
desire outcome.”); ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO LEGAL REASONING 29 (L. Thorne McCarty et al. 
eds., 1987) (“The announcement of an entirely new rule, perhaps with direct 
overruling of earlier decisions, is exceptional. More often the change is gradual, 
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The judicial system also seeks horizontal consistency in decision making 
by courts. Horizontal consistency is an important goal for the American legal 
system because it is only when people are treated (mostly) consistently under the 
law that they can truly be said to have equal rights and equal protections.
56
 Thus, 
the federal judicial system is structured so that the courts of appeal are divided 
into separate geographic circuits each of which pronounces legal decisions that 
are binding for all of the district courts within the particular circuit court’s 
geographic area.
57
 The district courts are bound to apply the decisions of the 
appellate court in their circuit,
58
 and thus a good deal of horizontal consistency is 
present in each circuit,
59
 as well as a certain amount of vertical consistency.  
 
as apparently relevant precedents are distinguished away or are extended to cover 
new situations.”).  
56
 See Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the 
Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
713, 718-19 (2009) (“In the federal appellate courts, the law of the circuit rule 
implements the policy of horizontal stare decisis. The law of the circuit rule 
provides that the decision of one panel is the decision of the court and binds all 
future panels unless and until the panel’s opinion is reversed or overruled, 
either by the circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court. Every circuit follows 
the law of the circuit rule.”). 
57
 Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit 
Doctrine, 56 LOY. L. REV. 535, 538 (2010) (“The regional structure of the courts 
of appeals, together with the law of the circuit doctrine, values intracircuit 
consistency over national uniformity. Decisions are rendered by panels of three 
judges; en banc decisions are rare. To promote intracircuit consistency, the “prior 
panel rule” or “rule of interpanel accord” holds that the decision of any 
panel binds the court of appeals itself and the district courts within the circuit.”). 
58
 Colin E. Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of Appeals’ Precedent: 
Contrasting Approaches to Applying Court of Appeals’ Federal Law Holdings 
and Erie State Law Predictions, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1, 15 (2006) 
(“However, West’s applicability to  district courts faced with a federal court of 
appeals’ Erie prediction must be analyzed by reference to the established 
principle of stare decisis that requires district courts to adhere to their superior 
federal court of appeals’ decisions”); Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of 
Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93 MICH. L. REV. 703, 706-7 (1995) (“A 
district court applies the law of its circuit because its circuit court is the next-
higher court in the federal hierarchy—the court that will review its decisions.”) 
59
 Id. The exception to this rule is the Federal Circuit, which has jurisdiction 
based on subject matter rather than geography. Wayne T. Ault, Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit: A Lesson on the Effects of a Poorly Drafted 
Statute, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 943, 943 (1987) (“The statute that created the Court of 
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The federal circuit courts also have a rule that a later panel of judges 
cannot overrule the statement of an earlier panel as to a specific legal rule.
60
 This 
too helps promote horizontal consistency at the district court level because it 
means that appellate decisions, once made, can only be changed by the circuit 
court when it meets as a whole (“en banc”) to reevaluate an existing rule.61 Thus, 
in In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit met en banc to change the “useful, concrete 
and tangible result” test for the patentability of processes and substitute the 
“machine-or-transformation” test.62  
To achieve even greater horizontal consistency, the Supreme Court is set 
as the highest court of the land and reviews decisions of the circuit courts.
63
 The 
Supreme Court has discretion as to which cases it will review,
64
 but it is more 
 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit or court) defined the new court’s 
jurisdiction in terms of subject matter rather than geography.”). The Federal 
Circuit has sole jurisdiction over all appeals of patent cases, no matter what 
district court tried the patent case. George C. Beighley, Jr., The Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit: Has it Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671, 673 n.3 (2011) (“The Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction extends to all appeals from all cases arising under the patent 
laws”), see also Ault, supra, at 959-61. 
60
 Sydney M. Leach, Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on Patent Law, 1 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 31, 31 (1992) (“Because the Federal Circuit sits in 
panels of three judges, if two decisions of the Federal Circuit are in conflict, the 
earlier decision is the controlling precedent because a later panel of only three 
judges cannot overrule a prior decision of the court.”); Sloan, supra note 16, at 
718-19. 
61
 Id. 
62
 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The machine or 
transformation test was duly overturned by the Supreme Court. See infra notes 
156-163, and accompanying text. 
63
 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1948) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, any party 
may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice 
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or 
proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a 
district court of three judges.”). 
64
 28 U.S.C. §1257 (1988) (“(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the 
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the 
United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State 
is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, 
treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or 
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or 
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likely to take a case if the circuit courts are split on the interpretation of a 
particular law.
65
 The Supreme Court thus sees part of its mandate as settling 
disputed interpretations of the law among the circuit courts.
66
 Once the Supreme 
Court has decided an issue, all lower courts—circuit and district courts—are 
bound to apply the law according to the Supreme Court’s interpretation.67 This 
obviously results in substantial horizontal consistency, as well as some increased 
vertical consistency.  
The Supreme Court does not value horizontal inconsistency reduction 
above all else, however. In fact, the Supreme Court is well-known for at times 
allowing circuit splits to exist for a period of time before deciding the disputed 
issue so as to have the benefit of the argument among the circuit courts as well as 
the benefit of seeing how the application of the differing interpretations works 
out in the various circuits.
68
 Thus, we see the Supreme Court allowing manifest 
inconsistency to continue for an indefinite period of time and even attempting to 
“profit” from its presence.69 
 
statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United 
States.”). See also Mary Ann Lane, “Interactive Services” and the Future of 
Internet Radio Broadcasts, 62 ALA. L. REV. 459, 470 (2011) (“Although the 
Supreme Court recently denied Arista Records’ petition for writ of certiorari, 
future appellate court interpretations of the meaning of “interactive service” 
could lead to a circuit split and an issue later ripe for Supreme Court review.”). 
65
 See Lane, supra note 64.  See also C. Dan Black, Georgia v. Randolph: A 
Murky Refinement of the Fourth Amendment Third-Party Consent Doctrine, 42 
GONZ. L. REV. 321, 327 (2006-2007) (“Georgia sought review by the United 
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority 
among the circuits and states”); Duffy, supra note 48.  
66
 See Black, supra note 25. 
67
 Serge Krimnus, The Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents at Death’s Door, 12 
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 159, 193 (2010) (“It is axiomatic that lower courts are bound 
by the decisions of the Supreme Court.”). 
68
 Frank B. Cross et al., Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1403 (2009) 
(“The Supreme Court hears many fewer cases and consequently has the 
advantage of having considerably more time to evaluate the legal issues. The 
Court often has far better legal and other information on which to ground its 
decisions. Moreover, circuit courts may be regarded as agents of the Supreme 
Court, so it seems appropriate to consider the evaluations of their principal.”) 
69
 See, e.g., Bryan K. Weir, It’s (not so) Plain to See: The Circuit Split on the 
Plain View Doctrine in Digital Searches, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 83, 
121 (2010) (“Unfortunately, it appears that an abolition of the plain view doctrine 
in digital searches will have to wait. Supreme Court review of the current split in 
the near future seems unlikely. Even with the divergent circuit rulings, the Court 
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The second type of inconsistency in the judicial system that we discuss is 
vertical inconsistency. This is simply the inconsistency that results when higher 
courts decide cases differently than lower courts. Because higher courts exist to 
correct errors on the part of lower courts,
70
 one should obviously expect that a 
fair bit of vertical inconsistency will occur, and is indeed expected in the 
system.
71
 Nevertheless, there are costs of vertical inconsistency. For one thing, 
litigants will experience a longer period of uncertainty before knowing the 
ultimate resolution of their disputes if a high level of vertical inconsistency is the 
norm. In such a vertically inconsistent system, litigants will also tend to spend 
more money on litigation given that the party that loses below will have more 
incentive to appeal if the chances of reversal in a higher court are substantial.
72
 In 
addition, if a judicial system had very weak vertical consistency, litigants might 
sue over even clearly decided legal questions simply in hopes that the district 
court would decide the issue differently than the appellate court.
73
  
 
has denied a certiorari petition…Perhaps after more courts have grappled with 
this issue and applied the various theories, the Supreme Court will decide the 
issue with more guidance”). 
70
 See Hoffstadt, supra note 44. 
71
 Heidi A. Reamer, Defining Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance 
Under the Nondiscrimination Statutes, 57 WASH. & LEE L.  REV. 1355, 1389-90 
(2000) (“However, lower courts’ application of the indirect recipient theory is 
problematic for two main reasons—vertical inconsistency and horizontal 
inconsistency.
 
 First, lower courts’ application is vertically inconsistent because 
they often misapply the theory as limited by the Supreme Court.”) 
72
 Erin O’Hara, Social Constrain of Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game of 
Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 766 (1993); 
Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate 
Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger 
Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217, 234 (2006) (“Appellate opinions 
that do not bind subsequent panels or district courts also risk inconsistent 
treatment by litigants bound by the law in that circuit. For example, a litigant has 
incentive to rely on a non-precedential opinion because of the possibility that a 
district court or circuit panel will follow the non-precedential reasoning. A 
litigant has incentive to use non-precedential opinions not just because the facts 
may be similar or the reasoning persuasive but also for ’the added boost of 
claiming that three court of appeals judges endorse that reasoning.’”). 
73
 Jennifer E. Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A Former Clerk’s View of the 
Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 875, 911-12 (1998) (“Lack of 
consistency and predictability in a circuit’s law encourages appeals to take 
advantage of the uncertainty. Because there is a good chance of running into an 
outlier panel or a panel reflective of one of the court’s polarizations, even 
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Thus, the court system designer has a motive to limit vertical 
inconsistency, even while not eliminating it. A number of mechanisms are 
present in the judicial system that reflect a robust attitude toward vertical 
inconsistency reduction. They include, among others, a limited number of 
appeals, a limited number of reasons for which an appeal can be pursued, and, as 
previously mentioned, the discretion granted the Supreme Court in deciding to 
hear cases.
74
 This discretion is based also on the understanding that resources are 
limited—there is only one Supreme Court—and that only those cases whose 
decision has the highest potential to benefit society should be taken by the 
Court.
75
 Other cases are “left behind” even if their dispositions could eliminate 
certain inconsistency present in the legal system. They are just less worthy of the 
limited time that the Supreme Court has. The inconsistency robustness paradigm 
thus is useful in making determinations about the costs and benefits of error 
correction and vertical and horizontal inconsistency, and has been applied by 
courts for a long time, at least intuitively.   
III. Different Approaches to Crafting Inconsistency Robust Patent Law 
Systems: The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Regularly and Reliably 
Differ on Rules Versus Standards in Patent Law 
Having set out the two types of error and two main forms of 
inconsistency that exist in the United States federal court system in Part II, we 
now focus on one specific aspect and subject matter of that system—the 
interaction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
 
lawyers with weak cases have a strong incentive to ‘roll the dice’ on appeal and 
hope the random draw of panel judges comes out in their favor.”); J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY 
L.J. 1147, 1175 (1994) (discussing wide varieties of possible panels of judges 
create murky law, increasing litigation due to the “uncertainty of outcomes 
resulting from a cacophony of differing opinions [that] can act as a catalyst for 
yet more appeals.”) 
74
 Weir, supra note 69. 
75
 Arthur D. Hellman, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 297, 299 (1986) (“In all but a small fraction of the Supreme Court’s cases, 
review is discretionary with the Court, and that discretion is exercised primarily 
to select cases that have general importance in the development of the law.”); 
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 656 
(1993) (“If the issue is of general importance the Supreme Court may hear the 
case. At this point in the process, an issue, not just a case, is clearly being 
debated. The Court will hear argument about the issue…The Supreme Court is 
important, like the President, or Congress: it is the “last” judicial voice, at least 
for this round.”) 
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when it comes to deciding patent cases.
76
 The IR paradigm was useful to us in 
analyzing a previously underexplored recurring pattern of disagreement that 
characterizes the Federal Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s divergent patent law 
decisions. Specifically, since its creation, the Federal Circuit has increasingly 
tended towards the refinement of legal rules until they become bright-line rules 
that can be applied with high levels of predictability and consistency by lower 
courts.
77
 In contrast, the Supreme Court has increasingly overturned Federal 
Circuit patent decisions that set forth bright-line rules.
78
 The Supreme Court has 
consistently replaced the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rules with standards that 
have the benefit of promoting flexible decision-making, but, simultaneously, 
allow more inconsistency to persist in the system. 
We believe that this pattern of disagreement is largely driven by the two 
courts’ differing intuitive views as to how to address inconsistencies, and what is 
the beneficially allowable level of inconsistency in the area of patent law. 
Although this pattern has been present in the past few decades, to our knowledge 
only one other scholar has attempted to systemically analyze the pattern. Peter 
Lee discussed rule formalism in the Federal Circuit versus holistic standards at 
the Supreme Court when it comes to patent law.
79
 He argued that cultural 
differences between the two courts and the “cognitive miser” bias help explain 
this trend.
80
 Our analysis is different. We believe that it is the courts’ roles as 
system administrators at different levels within the system that best explains the 
differences between adoption of rules and standards that we repeatedly see. Other 
scholars have noted the Supreme Court’s replacement of rules with standards in 
specific areas of patent law, but they do not discuss this as a systemic, recurring 
pattern in patent law.
 81
 Adopting the IR perspective and analyzing the roles of 
 
76
 Note that while this Article considers only the United States federal court 
system, much of what is discussed about the interactions between trial and 
appellate courts has relevance to other court systems. 
77
 See infra, notes 84-163 and accompanying text. 
78
 Id.  
79
 Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010) 
(identifying cultural differences between the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
and arguing that the Supreme Court utilizes a more holistic analysis, which 
engages with technology more, while the Federal Circuit relies on formalism to 
limit its need to analyze technologies at issue) 
80
 Id. 
81
 Scholars have, however, identified differences in approach between the 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit, and have commented on the use of rules 
versus standards in particular areas of patent law, but not systemically. See, e.g., 
Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2011 
WISC. L. REV. 1353 (2011); John Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of 
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the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit as system administrators enabled us to 
fully analyze this pattern. We also believe that the IR perspective provides the 
best among competing explanations for this pattern.  
Our contention is that the Federal Circuit has repeatedly resorted to 
bright-line rules in an attempt to minimize, if not eliminate, the two types of 
inconsistency—horizontal inconsistency and vertical inconsistency. More 
precisely, we observe that the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court may each be 
focusing on reducing inconsistency—or at least error—in different aspects of the 
system, and may each be comfortable with inconsistency—or at least error—in 
other aspects of the system. We believe that when it comes to patent cases, 
however, because of the different costs and burdens the two courts bear from 
inconsistency and error correction, the Federal Circuit values horizontal and 
vertical inconsistency reduction more, while the Supreme Court places greater 
value on the elimination of manifest error. This means that correspondingly, the 
Federal Circuit has more tolerance for manifest error that comes from its bright-
line rules, while the Supreme Court has more tolerance for horizontal and vertical 
inconsistency that comes from adopting standards.  
In the almost thirty years since the Federal Circuit began hearing cases in 
1983, the Court has produced a single body of law to which district courts can 
look to decide patent cases,
82
 i.e. it has significantly reduced horizontal 
 
Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609 (2009) (discussing divergent 
preference for rules versus standards on the parts of the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit in the area of patentable subject matter); Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Substantive versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 123 (2005) (arguing that in the area of claim construction, the 
Federal Circuit utilizes bright-line substantive rules, while the Supreme Court 
utilizes process-based formalistic rules); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme 
Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003) (identifying Federal Circuit preference for bright-
line rules and arguing that Supreme Court facilitates such formalism in its review 
of patent cases); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003) 
(criticizing Federal Circuit’s arrogation of fact finding to itself while engaging in 
rule formalism, and suggesting multi-institutional reform that takes into account 
institutional design of the patent system). 
82
 Thomas W. Adams, The 1988 Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1931(C): Corporate 
Venue is Now Equivalent to In Personam Jurisdiction Effects on Civil Actions for 
Patent Infringement, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357, 369 (1991) (“The Federal Circuit 
has eliminated many of the former conflicts among the circuits in interpreting 
patents and deciding their validity, and has provided a single guiding light for 
questions of patent law in the district courts, the Patent and Trademark Office, 
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inconsistency. The Supreme Court seems to believe, however, that the Federal 
Circuit has engaged in a certain amount of suboptimal decision making by 
choosing to achieve this goal through the adoption of too many bright-line 
rules.
83
  
Evidence that the Federal Circuit has attempted to create consistency in 
the application of patent laws can be found in numerous patent cases—the most 
significant of which are discussed below—that involved the creation of bright-
line rules. In the remainder of this Part, we discuss five areas of law in which the 
Federal Circuit has developed bright-line rules that the Supreme Court 
subsequently overturned and replaced with more contextual standards. The five 
areas of patent law are: obviousness; the doctrine of equivalents; standing in 
declaratory judgment cases involving patents; standards for granting injunctive 
relief for patent infringement; and patentable subject matter. We discuss each 
area in turn. 
A. Obviousness 
The requirement that a patent be nonobvious was codified in the 1952 
Patent Act.
84
 The statute merely says that an invention is not patentable if it 
“would have been obvious at the time the invention was made,” and leaves it to 
the courts to determine obviousness.
85
 Whether an invention is obvious is an 
inherently difficult question to answer, and one that lends itself to a good deal of 
inconsistent opinion. The Supreme Court first interpreted the obviousness 
requirement in light of the 1952 Patent Act in 1966 in Graham v. John Deere.
86
 
There the Supreme Court set out a complex, contextual, multifactor analysis for 
 
and for practitioners in the specialty of patent law. In effect, the Federal Circuit is 
the final arbiter of the majority of patent questions.”) Many commentators also 
believe that the Court indeed has been friendlier to patent interests than some of 
the circuit courts were before 1983. Katherine J. Strandburg, Law and the 
Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the “Patent Explosion 
21 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1293, 1329 (2006) (“In 1983, the Federal Circuit 
published its first patent opinion, inaugurating what many have argued has been 
an era of patent-friendly legal review after a period of purported judicial hostility 
to patentees.”). 
83
 Lee, supra note 46 at 42 (“The Court’s recent and significant reentry into 
patent law has attracted considerable academic attention. For most observers, the 
Court’s aggressiveness reflects an attempt to rein in patent rights that had become 
too expansive under Federal Circuit jurisprudence.”). 
84
 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
85
 Id. The new America Invents Act of 2011 does not change this standard. 
See new 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
86
 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). 
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determining obviousness.
87
 Upon its creation, and for years thereafter, the 
Federal Circuit struggled with the standard for obviousness, and the inherent 
unpredictability and uncertainty arising from the Supreme Court’s approach.88 
Eventually, the Federal Circuit adopted the “teaching suggestion or motivation” 
(“TSM”) test.89 Under this test, the Federal Circuit ruled that a patent could not 
be held invalid unless the district court could point to a particular teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation in the technical literature that suggested the 
combination of elements that resulted in the patented invention.
90
 There was 
 
87
 Id. at 17. (“Under §103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be 
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be 
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.”) 
88
 See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Dembiczak, 175 
F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re 
Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Steven J. Lee et al., Teaching, 
Suggestion and Motivation: KSR v. Telefex and the Chemical Arts, 17 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 915, 917 (2007) (“The TSM test was created 
in order to preclude a court’s engaging in a hindsight-based obviousness analysis, 
which is impermissible. As the Federal Circuit has stressed in numerous 
obviousness decisions, the inventor’s own disclosure—the claimed invention 
itself—cannot be used as a “blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat 
patentability—the essence of hindsight.” It was this strong distaste for hindsight 
reconstruction that led the Federal Circuit to adopt and then very rigorously apply 
the TSM test.”) 
89
 In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“That being so, the 
next questions are (a) whether a combination of the teachings of all or any of the 
references would have suggested (expressly or by implication) the possibility of 
achieving further improvement by combining such teachings along the line of the 
invention in suit, and (b) whether the claimed invention achieved more than a 
combination which any or all of the prior art references suggested, expressly or 
by reasonable implication. These manifestly related tests are indicated as 
appropriate by the following decisions of the former Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals reviewing, as we do here, decisions of the board denying patentability 
under § 103 on obviousness grounds.”). See also Sarah A. Geers, Common Sense 
and the Fact Finder Without Skill in the Art: The Role of Objective Evidence in 
Achieving Proper Technology Specificity, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 225, 232 
(2010) (“In the years following the Graham decision and the creation of the 
Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit did indeed usher in an era of more well-
defined and rigorous use of the TSM test.”) 
90
 See Al-Site Corp v. VSI Intern., Inc., 174 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The 
party seeking patent invalidity based on obviousness must also show some 
motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings. A suggestion or 
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some debate about whether the teaching, suggestion, or motivation had to be 
written, but this was at the least greatly preferred.
91
  
The benefit of the TSM test was that it gave fairly clear criteria for 
determining obviousness, and thus decreased horizontal and vertical 
inconsistency. The detriment of the test was that it allowed patents on a number 
of inventions that would otherwise have been thought obvious if the patent office 
could not point to a specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine all of 
the elements claimed in an invention.
92
 Thus, a number of seemingly obvious 
inventions were patented.
93
  
The Supreme Court rejected any rigid, narrow application of the TSM 
test in 2007 in KSR v. Teleflex.
94
 The case involved the question of whether a 
 
motivation to combine generally arises in the references themselves, but may also 
be inferred from the nature of the problem or occasionally from the knowledge of 
those of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1355. 
91
 Tamir Packin, A New Test for Obviousness in Combination Patents: 
Economic Synergy, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 973 (2006) (“The Federal Circuit 
has held that this test can be implicit and does not need to be explicit. The issue 
of how explicit the suggestion needs to be is a topic of current debate; some 
commentators suggest that although the Federal Circuit theoretically allows for 
an implicit suggestion, Federal Circuit case law applying the “suggestion” test 
consistently requires an explicit suggestion.”); Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-
Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court 
in KSR v. Telefex, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007) (“Under Federal Circuit case 
law, a decision-maker may rely on an implicit suggestion or motivation to 
combine prior art references—the suggestion or motivation does not need to be 
recorded or documented.”). 
92
 Mandel, supra note 91 (“The challenge to the suggestion test before the 
Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex is relatively straightforward. Petitioners argue 
that the test improperly lowers the non-obvious standard by causing inventions 
for which there is no suggestion to combine references in the prior art to be held 
non-obvious, even though certain of these inventions actually are obvious.”).  
93
 Mandel, supra note 91 (“The petitioner in KSR, backed by amici briefs 
from the Solicitor General of the United States, industry representatives, and a 
number of intellectual property professors, argues that the suggestion test violates 
the Patent Act and the Supreme Court’s non-obvious precedent because it results 
in certain actually obvious advances instead being held non-obvious. Their 
argument is that combining references may have been obvious even if there was 
no explicit suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the references in the 
prior art.”) 
94
 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007). 
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movable gas pedal with an electronic sensor was obvious.
95
 Prior automotive 
pedal designs included movable pedals, and pedals with electronic sensors.
96
 The 
question before the court was whether combining a moveable design with an 
electronic sensor was obvious.
97
 The Federal Circuit had held that it was not, 
citing the lack of teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the two types of 
pedals.
98
 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that such a combination was 
obvious because it was where the industry was inevitably headed.
99
 In its 
decision, the Court reiterated its contextual approach set out in Graham v. John 
Deere.
100
 The Court preferred a more flexible approach that encouraged more 
nuanced decisions to the bright-line TSM test.
101
 Thus we see an example of the 
Federal Circuit preferring to reduce horizontal and vertical inconsistency while 
the Supreme Court preferred to reduce manifest error deriving from the 
application of said bright-line rule. The Supreme Court has the final say, of 
course, and thus substituted its view of proper inconsistency robustness for that 
of the Federal Circuit. 
B. Doctrine of Equivalents 
A similar pattern can be discerned regarding the law of prosecution 
history estoppel of infringement claims based on the doctrine of equivalents. 
Patent law allows a patent owner to exclude others from using both his claimed 
invention and near equivalents.
102
 When a patentee amends his patent during 
prosecution before the patent office so as to narrow the scope of the claimed 
invention, the question is whether he may thereafter assert the right to exclude 
equivalents to his invention.
103
 Courts have always been hesitant to allow 
patentees to benefit from the application of the doctrine of equivalents in these 
 
95
 Id. at 406. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. at 407. 
99
 Id. at 424. 
100
 Id. at 406. 
101
 See id. at 413-4 
102
 Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 
(2002) (“The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead 
embraces all equivalents to the claims described.”).  
103
 Id. at 733-34 (“When, however, the patentee originally claimed the 
subject matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to a 
rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen 
subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the issued 
patent.”). 
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cases
104
 and, ultimately, adopted the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel to 
limit infringement claims via equivalents for claims that had been narrowed 
during prosecution.
105
 
The question, then, became what the parameters should be for invoking 
prosecution history estoppel, and what should be the boundaries of the estoppel? 
The Federal Circuit struggled with these questions and finally settled on a bright-
line rule.
106
 The Federal Circuit held that if a patentee narrowed his patent claim 
in any way during prosecution, then he was absolutely barred from invoking the 
doctrine of equivalents for the narrowed claims.
107
 This again promoted great 
reductions in horizontal and vertical inconsistency.  
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s approach in Festo v. 
Shoketsu in 2002.
108
 The Supreme Court held that an absolute bar to invoking the 
doctrine of equivalents was too severe, and that instead, patentees would be 
estopped from invoking the doctrine only as to equivalents that were foreseeable 
at the time of patent prosecution.
109
 Here again the Supreme Court rejected the 
 
104
 See, e.g., Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 122, 128 
(1880) (“In view of [the amendment] there can be no doubt of what [the patentee] 
understood he had patented, and that both he and the commissioner regarded the 
patent to be for a manufacture made exclusively of vulcanites by the detailed 
process”); Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136-37 
(1942).  
105
 Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-32 
(1997); Festo, 535 U.S. at 734-35 (“Prosecution history estoppel ensures that the 
doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose. Where the original 
application once embraced the purported equivalent but the patentee narrowed 
his claims to obtain the patent or to protect its validity, the patentee cannot assert 
that he lacked the words to describe the subject matter in question. The doctrine 
of equivalents is premised on language’s inability to capture the essence of 
innovation, but a prior application describing the precise element at issue 
undercuts that premise. In that instance the prosecution history has established 
that the inventor turned his attention to the subject matter in question, knew the 
words for both the broader and narrower claim, and affirmatively chose the 
latter.”); Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., 103 
F.3d 1571, 1577-1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Prosecution history estoppel ... 
preclud[es] a patentee from regaining, through litigation, coverage of subject 
matter relinquished during prosecution of the application for the patent”). 
106
 Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,  
107
 Id. 
108
 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002). 
109
 Id. at 738. 
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Federal Circuit’s bright line rule in favor of a more nuanced one.110 Interestingly, 
however, in this case the Supreme Court’s rule was also fairly bright. Thus we 
see an example of the Supreme Court again substituting its preference for a 
greater reduction of manifest error, but to a lesser degree than in the case of the 
rule regarding obviousness.  
C. Declaratory Judgment Standing 
The divergent approaches to deciding when a declaratory judgment 
patent case may be brought shows again the differing approaches to 
inconsistency and error by the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court. Although the 
statute governing declaratory judgments is of general application,
111
 over time, 
the Federal Circuit developed a specialized approach to patent cases that made it 
very difficult for potential patent defendants to sue for declaratory judgments.
112
 
Even though the Declaratory Judgment Act vests discretion in the trial 
courts as to whether to hear declaratory judgment actions,
113
 The Federal Circuit 
developed a rule that, in patent cases, required a court to find that there was a 
“reasonable apprehension of suit” against the would-be plaintiff in a declaratory 
judgment action.
114
 If a potential infringer could not show evidence of a 
reasonable apprehension of suit, under the Federal Circuit’s rule, a district court 
did not have standing to hear the case.
115
 The Federal Circuit interpreted this 
 
110
 Id. 
111
 David I. Levine, Declaratory Relief After Medimmune, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 491, 494 (2010) (“In [the place of the Federal Circuit’s use of 
declaratory relief], the Court substituted an older, and broader, totality-of-
circumstances test, which has been used commonly in actions for declaratory 
relief to determine whether a controversy exists.”). 
112
 Peter J. Shurn III, Using Declaratory Judgments Offensively in Patent 
Cases – DJ Jive, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 4 (2003) 
(“This Federal Circuit approach gives a tremendous advantage to the plaintiff in a 
patent-based declaratory judgment action to the detriment of the patent-owning 
defendant”) 
113
 Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-343 (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006)); Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. 
Ct. 764 (2010). 
114
 Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
115
 Medimmune, 427 F.3d at 965 (“Thus although courts have discretion in 
deciding whether to accept a declaratory action when the constitutional and 
statutory requirements are met, there is no discretion to accept an action when 
there is no controversy of immediacy or reality because there is no reasonable 
apprehension of suit.”) 
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requirement strictly against potential infringers, such that mere allegations by a 
patentee that a product or process infringed a patent could not be the basis for a 
declaratory judgment suit.
116
 Even allegations of infringement coupled with 
invitations to pay royalties were not enough to provide standing in these cases.
117
 
Additionally, the rule became stricter over time, as the Federal Circuit seemed to 
move to a rule requiring not just a “reasonable apprehension of suit,” but instead 
a “reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.”118  
The Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule allowed an elaborate practice to 
grow according to which patent owners would write letters to alleged infringers 
making the infringers aware of the relevant patents, suggesting that the patents 
applied to the alleged infringers product(s), and offering to discuss licensing 
terms.
119
 By couching the letters so as to be somewhat vague as to the exact 
infringement analysis, and often even as to which patents might be infringed by 
which products, and by not including any direct threat of suit, patent owners 
could be quite confident under the Federal Circuit’s rule that they would not be 
subject to a declaratory judgment suit.
120
 Patent owners found this beneficial 
because they could all but directly threaten a lawsuit if an alleged infringer did 
not license the patents at issue and, simultaneously, control if and when any 
litigation was brought.
121
 In addition, by making potential patent infringers aware 
of the patents, the patent owners opened up the possibility of treble damages 
because the alleged infringers would henceforth be “willful” infringers, absent an 
 
116
 Medimmune, 427 F.3d at 958; Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 
F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Gen-Probe, 323 F.3d at 956. 
117
 Teva Pharm. USA, 395 F.3d at 1324. 
118
Id. at 1333. 
119
 Michael Donovan, The Impact of Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. and 
Its Progeny on Technology Licensing, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 39, 58 
(2009) (“[T]hings have changed, favoring the accused infringer/potential 
licensee. No longer can a patent owner send a letter to a potential infringer 
informing them that their product may be infringing and that a license may be in 
order; this could be enough to confer declaratory action jurisdiction.”). 
120
  Micron Tech., Inc. v. MOSAID Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (dismissing declaratory judgment); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, 
Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (dismissing declaratory judgment) 
121
 Sean M. O’Connor, Using Stock and Stock Options to Minimize Patent 
Royalty Payment Risks After Medimmune v. Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J L. & BUS. 
381, 448-9 (2007) (“In practice, however, in the wake of MedImmune, licensees 
will likely not challenge the patent in any other way than a declaratory judgment 
action, thus effectively depriving the licensor of any meaningful opportunity to 
take control of the litigation as plaintiff by suing the licensee first.”) 
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informed and good faith belief that the patents were invalid or not infringed.
122
 
On the other hand, potential infringers had no way to clear any clouds as to 
infringement and validity of the patents that might cover their technology.
123
 
 
122
 In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Opinion 
letters may help avoid infringement but are not required.). 
123
 William F. Lee et al., Understanding and Addressing the Unfair Dilemma 
Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 
434 (2004) (“First, uncertainty about the scope of waiver following voluntary 
production of an opinion letter makes it difficult for the alleged willful infringer 
to resolve the dilemma in an informed and rational manner.”) In addition, to 
avoid potential willfulness treble damages, most potential infringers also felt 
obligated to seek opinion letters from counsel as to arguments for non-
infringement or invalidity. This in itself involved time and money, and provided 
on its own a motive to settle for at least nuisance value. Dov Greenbaum, In re 
Seagate: Did it Really Fix the Waiver Issue? A Short Review and Analysis of 
Waiver Resulting from the Use of a Counsel’s Opinion Letter as a Defense to 
Willful Infringement, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 194 (2008) (“Instead 
of framing the selectiveness of the waiver as only a waiver to a third party, 
perhaps the Federal Circuit can see this waiver as a very narrow subject matter 
waiver, that of only (but all) opinion letters referencing the opinion of counsel as 
to non-infringement.”); Geoffrey Shipsides, Advocacy or Counsel: The 
Continuing Dual Role of Written Infringement Opinion Letters and the Failure of 
Knorr-Bremse to Confine the Role of Patent Attorneys Issuing Written 
Infringement Opinion Letters, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1069, 1070 (“The 
infringement opinion has the second potential use of being produced as evidence 
at trial of the potential infringer’s state of mind for the determination of willful 
infringement.
 
Patent attorneys, aware of this possible evidentiary use of 
infringement opinion letters, know that the letter is also the place to advocate for 
their client’s position of non-infringement.”); Damon C. Andrews, Why 
Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 222 (2011) (“While 
several scholars have advanced the theory that parties are prone to settle disputes 
in the interest of avoiding costly trials,
 
the intricate issues that are inherent 
to patent litigation provide a platform for discussing why patentees are especially 
willing to settle to avoid additional harms other than just the expense of 
litigating.”); John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 2111, 2133 (2007) (“Moreover, even aside from being handicapped by 
information asymmetries, the patent holder is likely to be burdened by the 
knowledge that it faces significant potential costs if negotiations fail. Such costs 
of negotiating failure could drive the patent holder to settle for substantially less 
than the patented invention’s more intrinsic economic worth.”). 
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The Supreme Court overruled the Federal Circuit’s strict, bright-line rule 
in Medimmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc.
124
 In that case, the Supreme Court again 
replaced the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule with a more contextual standard, 
and also vested more discretion in individual district courts.
125
 In that case, 
petitioner Medimmune had a license to Genentech’s patents allegedly covering 
Medimmune’s drug, Synagis, which was used to prevent respiratory infections in 
infants and children.
126
 When the parties entered the license, it included the rights 
to a license under a pending Genentech patent.
127
 When that patent was granted, 
Medimmune disputed that the patent, as granted, was valid, and also disputed 
that Synagis infringed.
128
 Moreover, because the license only required payments 
for any patents that were both infringed and valid, Medimmune argued that it was 
no longer contractually required to make payments to Genentech.
129
 Genentech 
disagreed, arguing that the patent was valid and infringed, and thus that payments 
were still owed under the license.
130
 Rather than risk a lawsuit for breach of 
contract and patent infringement, Medimmune continued to pay “under protest 
and with reservation of all or [its] rights.”131 Medimmune than brought a 
declaratory judgment action, seeking a ruling that the patent was invalid and non-
infringed, and that no payments were owed under the contract.
132
  
Despite “serious misgivings,” the district court dismissed the case at the 
motion to dismiss stage in accordance with the Federal Circuit’s clear rule.133 
Under that rule, so long as Medimmune continued to make payments under the 
license, it could not have any apprehension of suit, much less a “reasonable 
apprehension of imminent suit.”134 The Federal Circuit, citing its precedent with 
 
124
 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
125
 Id. at 136 (“We have found it ‘more consistent with the statute,’ however, 
‘to vest district courts with discretion in the first instance, because facts bearing 
on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case 
for resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp.’”). 
126
 Id. at 121 (“Petitioner MedImmune, Inc., manufactures Synagis, a drug 
used to prevent respiratory tract disease in infants and young children. In 1997, 
petitioner entered into a patent license agreement with respondent Genentech, 
Inc.”). 
127
Id. at 121-22. 
128
 Id. 
129
 Id. 
130
 Id. 
131
 Id. 
132
 Id. at 122. 
133
 Id. at 136. 
134
 Id. at 128 (“Assuming (without deciding) that respondents here could not 
claim an anticipatory breach and repudiate the license, the continuation of royalty 
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regard to its bright-line rule on declaratory judgment standing, upheld the district 
court’s dismissal of Medimmune’s suit.135  
The Supreme Court reversed.
136
 The Court stated that the Federal 
Circuit’s rule was inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedents.137 The 
Court did not set forth a simple, bright-line rule for when standing is properly 
found in a declaratory judgment action. Instead, the Court gave examples of 
interests at stake that would be sufficient to create an actual controversy needed 
for jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
138
 These interests simply 
had to be significant, and a party needed to have an actual dispute as to its 
obligations.
139
 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected any rule that a party needed to 
be in reasonable apprehension of suit before having standing in these cases.
140
  
Finally, the Supreme Court reminded the Federal Circuit of the Supreme 
Court’s prior cases holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act “confer[s] on 
 
payments makes what would otherwise be an imminent threat at least remote, if 
not nonexistent. As long as those payments are made, there is no risk that 
respondents will seek to enjoin petitioner’s sales. Petitioner’s own acts, in other 
words, eliminate the imminent threat of harm.”) 
135
 Id. at 122 (“The Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court, also relying 
on Gen–Probe. 427 F.3d 958 (2005).”) 
136
 Id. at 137. 
137
 Id. at 130 (“The only Supreme Court decision in point is, fortuitously, 
close on its facts to the case before us. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943), 
held that a licensee’s failure to cease its payment of royalties did not render 
nonjusticiable a dispute over the validity of the patent. In that litigation, several 
patentees had sued their licensees to enforce territorial restrictions in the 
license.”). 
138
 Id. at 127 (“Our decisions have required that the dispute be ‘definite and 
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests’; 
and that it be ‘real and substantial’ and ‘admi[t] of specific relief through a 
decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what 
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. 
v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-1 (1937)). The Court gave as examples of 
“actively contested legal rights” sufficient to give standing under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act: “actual or threatened serious injury to business or employment,” 
“imperil[ing] a man’s livelihood, his business enterprise, or his solvency,” and 
risking “actual [and] treble damages in infringement suits. Id. at 131-33. 
139
 Id. at 127. 
140
 Id. at 137 (“We hold that petitioner was not required, insofar as Article III 
is concerned, to break or terminate its 1997 license agreement before seeking a 
declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent is invalid, 
unenforceable, or not infringed.”) 
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federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the 
rights of litigants.
141
 The Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s bright-
line, reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test improperly deprived trial courts of this 
discretion.
142
  
Thus, in their approaches to declaratory judgment standing issues when it 
comes to patent cases, we see another example of how the Federal Circuit 
evolved a formal, bright-line rule, which the Supreme Court then rejected in 
favor of a more contextual, discretionary approach. Here again, the Federal 
Circuit’s rule provided certainty and horizontal and vertical consistency. The 
Supreme Court’s standard provided less predictability, and less horizontal 
consistency. But it also provided courts greater leeway to decide declaratory 
judgment actions when important economic interests are at stake. By allowing 
potential defendants to determine the validity and infringement status of patents 
before potentially infringing. 
D. Injunctions 
 
The difference in approach between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court over the standard for issuing injunctions is another example that conforms 
to our thesis that the Federal Circuit seeks to decrease inconsistency and increase 
predictability through bright-line rules while the Supreme Court seeks more 
contextual approaches that allow for more flexibility in deciding individual cases. 
There is a well-developed body of law on injunctions that the Supreme Court has 
developed over the course of its existence.
143
 Rather than developing special rules 
for how injunctions should be granted in various substantive areas of law, the 
Supreme Court applies the same equitable, four-factor test for whether an 
injunction should be granted regardless of the type of law at issue in a case.
144
  
 
141
 Id. at 136 (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)). 
142
 Id. at 136 (“The District Court here gave no consideration to discretionary 
dismissal, since, despite its ‘serious misgivings’ about the Federal Circuit’s rule, 
it considered itself bound to dismiss by Gen–Probe.”). 
143
 See e.g. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); New 
York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n. 10 (1994); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. 
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422-430 (1908); Dun v. Lumbermen’s 
Credit Assn., 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908). 
144
 The four factors require a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered 
an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
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Notwithstanding this long historical practice, the Federal Circuit, in 
perhaps one of the clearest displays of its drive to create bright-line, predictable 
rules, developed a body of cases holding that a court should issue an injunction 
as a matter of right when patent infringement occurs.
145
 The Federal Circuit’s 
rule was that courts “will issue permanent injunctions . . . absent exceptional 
circumstances.”146 The Federal Circuit developed this rule even though the 
statute authorizing injunctions in patent cases states that courts “may grant 
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity.”147 In eBay v. 
MercExchange,
148
 the Supreme Court overruled the aforementioned Federal 
Circuit’s approach.149 Specifically, the Supreme Court emphasized that there is 
no special rule for applying injunctions in patent cases, but that instead, the 
traditional four-factor equitable test must be applied.
150
  
In fairness to the Federal Circuit, historically, courts did grant injunctions 
for patent infringement in the vast majority of cases.
151
 Thus, had the Federal 
Circuit said, prior to eBay, that injunctions issue as a matter of course after a 
finding of infringement, the Federal Circuit would have been stating a truism. 
But historically, courts issued injunctions in patent cases under the traditional 
 
145
 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 
Lermer Germany GmbH v. Lermer Corp., 94 F.3d 1575, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1996); 
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed.Cir.1989); Rite-
Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed.Cir.1995); Roche Prods., Inc. 
v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-66 (Fed.Cir.1984). 
146
 eBay, 401 F.3d at 1339. 
147
 35 U.S.C. § 283 (emphasis added). The full text of the statue states that 
“[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant 
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of 
any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.” Id. 
148
 eBay, 547 U.S. at 388. 
149
 Id. at 394. 
150
 Id. at 390 (“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff 
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may 
grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.”). 
151
 Id. at 395 (“From at least the early 19th century, courts have granted 
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent 
cases.”) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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four-factor test.
152
 The majority opinion in eBay did not say that the historical 
practice was wrong.
153
 The majority opinion rather said that the Federal Circuit’s 
rule that stripped district courts of their equitable discretion to decide whether an 
injunction should issue was wrong.
154
 Here again, we see an example of the 
Supreme Court rejecting a bright-line rule crafted by the Federal Circuit. The 
Federal Circuit’s rule promoted predictability and horizontal consistency.155 But 
the Supreme Court was comfortable with much less horizontal consistency in 
exchange for more flexibility provided to district courts to exercise their 
equitable discretion so as to get injunction decisions “right” in terms of balancing 
 
152
 Id. at 390 (“Ordinarily, a federal court considering whether to award 
permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff applies the four-factor test 
historically employed by courts of equity.”). 
153
 But note that there was some dispute in the concurring opinions as to 
whether the historical practice of issuing injunctions as a matter of course in 
patent cases is still justified. Justice Roberts, joined by justices Scalia and 
Ginsburg, seemed to think that the historical practice of frequent patent issuance 
in patent cases continues to be justified “given the difficulty of protecting a right 
to exclude through monetary remedies.” Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(emphasis in original). Accordingly, Justice Roberts said that when district courts 
apply the four-factor test in deciding whether to issue an injunction after finding 
patent infringement, the courts should note that “a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic.” Id. (citing New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 
(1921) (opinion for the Court by Holmes, J.). Justice Kennedy, joined by justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, wrote a separate concurrence that focused on the 
rise of patent holding firms that do not practice the patents they own, but instead 
seek to monetize the patents through licensing and infringement suits (referred to 
as “non-practicing entities” or, derogatorily, as “trolls”). Id. at 396.  Kennedy 
argued that this change in the landscape of patent litigation should be kept in 
mind by district courts exercising their discretion in the issuance of injunctions 
for patent infringement. Id. Kennedy argued “the nature of the patent being 
enforced and the economic functions of the patent holder present considerations 
quite unlike earlier cases.” Id. Accordingly, Kennedy urged district courts 
deciding patent injunctions to “determine whether past practice fits the 
circumstances of the cases before them.” Id. 
154
 Id. at 394.  Although note that under the Federal Circuit’s “general rule,” 
district courts were allowed to deny injunctions under “exceptional 
circumstances” or in “rare instances . . . to protect the public interest.” eBay v. 
MercExchange, 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (2005). 
155
 Horizontal consistency was maximized under the Federal Circuit’s rule 
because all district court’s were required to enter injunctions absent “exceptional 
circumstances.” eBay, 401 F.3d at 1338. 
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the interests of the parties. Thus, once again one can argue that the Supreme 
Court is acting as a system designer seeking an inconsistency robust system. 
E. Patentable Subject Matter 
The Federal Circuit’s treatment of patentable subject matter also fits 
within its trend toward bright-line rules, although with some meandering along 
the way. For several years the Federal Circuit followed a general course of 
liberalizing the standard for patentable subject matter that the Supreme Court had 
started back in the 1980s.
156
 This approach to patentable subject matter ultimately 
lead to the 1999 State Street Bank
157
 decision in which the Federal Circuit ruled 
that business methods are within the scope of §101 of the patent statute. 
Nevertheless, over the course of the next decade the Federal Circuit struggled 
with what limits there should be to patentable subject matter, especially for 
process patents, and eventually settled on a bright-line rule in In re Bilski.
158
 In 
Bilski, the Federal Circuit adopted the “machine or transformation” test.159 Under 
this test, a process was patentable only if it was tied to a particular machine or 
caused a transformation of matter.
160
 This bright-line rule again decreased 
horizontal and vertical inconsistency. The Supreme Court, following its pattern, 
overturned the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule and replaced it with a more 
amorphous standard.
161
 The Supreme Court held that process patent claims are 
only unpatentable subject matter when they are too “abstract.”162 The Supreme 
Court left the exact contours of unpatentable abstractness to be developed by 
courts over time.
163
 This is a particularly striking example of the Supreme Court 
preferring standards to bright-line rules—and, consequently, devaluing horizontal 
 
156
 Emblematic in this regard is Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 
(1980), in which the Supreme Court cited a Congressional Committee report 
stating that “anything under the sun that is made by man” is patentable. 
157
 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1468, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
158
 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
159
 Id. 
160
 Id. 
161
 In re Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“But there are reasons to doubt 
whether the [machine-or-transformation test] should be the sole criterion for 
determining the patentability of inventions in the Information Age. As 
numerous amicus briefs argue, the machine-or-transformation test would create 
uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine 
techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data compression, and 
the manipulation of digital signals.”) 
162
 Id. at 3230. 
163
 Id. at 3229. 
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and vertical consistency—to allow greater flexibility to “cure” previous manifest 
error and to allow further development of the law of patentable subject matter.  
IV.Possible Explanations for the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court’s 
Divergent embrace of Rules versus Standards in Patent Law 
The pattern emerging from the five areas of patent law discussed in III is 
clear. The pattern includes two steps. First the Federal Circuit attempts horizontal 
and vertical inconsistency reduction via the creation of bright-line rules. Second, 
the Supreme Court weighs in with a focus on reducing manifest error, and 
reverses the bright-line rules. Unfortunately, it is also a pattern that, as previously 
described, has determined idiosyncratic changes in key elements of patent law 
and, thus, has created possible significant uncertainty for innovators in fields 
such as the online commerce and the software industry that are of great 
importance for the US economy.
164
 
There is a rich literature on the application of rules versus standards to 
legal questions.
165
 Rules provide predictability and consistency, while standards 
are less predictable but provide the opportunity for nuanced, contextual decision 
making.
166
 The Federal Circuit’s focus on creating predictability through 
 
164
 See Matthew DeIulio, Courts Left with Little Guidance Following the 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
285, 291 n.55 (2010) (“Sole application of the machine-or-transformation test 
would lead to uncertainty with regard to patents in several fields, including 
software, advanced diagnostic medicine, data compression, and digital signals.”) 
165
 See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1747 (2011); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007); Daniel Bodansky, Rules vs. Standards in 
International Environmental Law, 98 AM. PROC. SOC’Y. INT’L L. 275 (2004); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices for Rules and Standards, 106 HARV L. REV. 
22 (1992); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
166
 Kaplow supra note 85 at 589 (“most commonly, it is asserted that rules 
tend to be over- and/or underinclusive relative to standards.”); see also Burnstein, 
supra note 85 at 1771 (“Rules are bright-line and clear. Standards are flexible 
and adaptable.”). Cf. Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: 
Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1966 (1990) 
[hereinafter Artificial Intelligence and Law] (“The rule-based approach is 
particularly useful because in many domains much of an [expert system’s] 
knowledge is amenable to expression in if-then rules, many of which are 
‘heuristic.’ Heuristics are typically an expert’s individual synthesis of past 
problem solving, and they capture methods for making educated hunches. Expert 
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horizontal and vertical inconsistency reduction seems to have caused it to move 
toward bright-line rules and away from contextual standards. The result has been 
that horizontal and vertical consistency were increased (which also increases 
predictability),
167
 but at the “cost” of such things as increased manifest error in 
the form of more obvious patents being issued,
168
 the doctrine of equivalents 
being made unavailable for amended patent claims,
169
 limited availability of 
patent declaratory judgments, no flexibility to deny injunctions, and strict 
exclusions of some process patent claims.
170
 As discussed in Part III, over the last 
 
system provide a straightforward way to harness heuristic expertise, expressed as 
rules.”). 
167
 Thomas F. Gordon, Foundations of Argumentation Technology Summary 
of Habilitation Thesis (2009) (unpublished thesis, Technical University of Berlin) 
(on file with author) (“The first argument was based on the observation that rules 
are not intended primarily for resolving disputes after they have arisen, or justify 
legal decisions, but rather to guide behavior so as to prevent and void such 
disputes in the first place. Rules can guide behavior only to the extend [sic] that it 
is possible for individuals to learn the rules. That is, rules must be structured in 
such as [sic] way as to take the cognitive capabilities of humans into account.”); 
Artificial Intelligence and Law supra note 86 at 1968 (“[R]ule-based techniques 
have demonstrated utility for frequently performed analyses on stereotypical 
cases in stable, well-developed bodies of law.”) 
168
 Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1353 (2010) (“A legal regime governed by a set of 
bright-line rules will have high error costs because rules tend to be over- and 
under-inclusive”). 
169
 Festo, 535 U.S. at 732. 
170
 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960-1; see also Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two 
Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 80 (2010) (“In In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit 
overruled previous doctrine establishing an expansive, relatively bright-line 
approach to the patentability of processes.”) Note, however, that the Federal 
Circuit has not focused on bright-line rules to minimize vertical inconsistency in 
all areas. Specifically, in the key patent contexts such as novelty (§102(a) prior 
art), claim construction, and obviousness, Federal Circuit decisions are 
characterized by reversal rates of district courts’ decision equal to 36%, 33% and 
29% respectively. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine whether this 
comes from the Federal Circuit balancing the benefit of vertical inconsistency 
reduction differently in these areas, or whether these areas of patent law simply 
do not lend themselves to bright-line rules. Whatever the reason, these reversal 
rates are certainly significant in terms of vertical inconsistency. A recent study 
has shown that the Federal Circuit’s average reversal rate across all patent issue 
is equal to 8-18% and is the same as the reversal rates in regional circuits for 
 
IR 3-27.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/29/2012  4:17 PM 
201x]  139 
six years, the Supreme Court has reversed each of the Federal Circuit’s rules, and 
replaced them with more contextual standards intended to decrease manifest error 
but at the price of some decreased predictability (decreased horizontal and 
vertical inconsistency).
171
 In the remainder of this Part, we explore the possible 
reason for this difference in tolerance of error versus inconsistency between the 
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court. 
A. The Federal Circuit’s Special Mandate 
A possible explanation for the Federal Circuit’s intense focus on 
horizontal and vertical inconsistency reduction can be found, we believe, in this 
court’s perception that it has a special mandate—compared to the other circuit 
courts—to increase predictability when it comes to the application of patent 
law.
172
  
The Federal Circuit’s belief that it has a mandate to standardize the 
application of patent law is unsurprising given the events leading to the court’s 
creation. In the 1960’s and 1970’s in the United States, there came to be a 
 
private civil actions, particularly complex ones, like Bankruptcy, Securities and 
Contracts cases. See Ted Sichelman, Myth Of (Un)certainty at The Federal 
Circuit, (...) 2010. However, the reversal rate of certain key patent issues such as 
novelty (§102(a) prior art), claim construction and obviousness is way above 
such averages. Sichelman’s study seems not to appreciate the relative importance 
of each of the considered patent issues in concluding that the Federal Circuit is as 
predictable as other regional circuits i.e. the Federal Circuit is considered less 
predictable than other regional circuits because the patent issues with very 
high/above average reversal rates are among those with highest impact on 
patentability and patent value—not all the patent issues used to calculate the 
average have the same weight in patent law. 
171
 See supra, see also Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal 
Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1130 (2010) (“The 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, exerts downward, counter-pressure on 
the Federal Circuit, moving the intermediate appellate court and the law away 
from formal rule-like doctrine. As it has become more active in patent cases over 
the past decade, the Court has expressly stated in conjunction with several 
specific areas of patent law that greater flexibility is required. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has replaced a bright-line rule with a more flexible standard or 
balancing test with respect to numerous issues, some of which are unique to 
patent disputes but some of which also arise in other areas of the law.”) 
172
 Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in 
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 125 (2005) (“Congress 
created the Federal Circuit to consolidate patent law and increase its certainty 
and predictability.”). 
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general perception that the amount of uncertainty about the validity of patents, 
and the inconsistency with which patent cases were decided in different circuit 
and district courts (horizontal and vertical inconsistency), was harmful to both 
innovation and businesses.
173
 Accordingly, in 1982, Congress passed the Federal 
Courts Improvement Act, which merged the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals and the appellate division of the Court of Claims.
174
 The Act also 
mandated that henceforth all appeals of patent cases from any district court 
would be heard by the Federal Circuit.
175
 Prior to the act, patent cases were 
appealed from the district court in which they had been tried to whichever of the 
twelve federal appellate courts had geographic jurisdiction over the trial court.
176
 
The result was that the legal rules governing patents varied from circuit to 
circuit—horizontal inconsistency. In addition to that, a potential patent defendant 
had little control over where it might be sued, and thus did not know which of the 
rules from the circuit courts might be applied to its activities.
177
 Likewise, a 
 
173
 Id. 
174
 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 §125, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (c)-(d) 
(1992) 
175
 Id.; see also Alexandra B. Hess et al., Permissive Interlocutory Appeals at 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995-
2010), 60 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 763 (2011). 
176
 See Emmette F. Hale, III, The ‘Arising Under’ Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit: An Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
229, 231-2 (1986) (“The most significant change resulting from the creation of 
the Federal Circuit is the transfer of patent appeals from the appellate jurisdiction 
of the regional courts of appeal to the Federal Circuit. The CAFC has exclusive 
jurisdiction over any appeal taken from the final decision of a district court ‘if the 
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338’ with an 
exception for any ‘case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress 
relating to copyrights or trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a).’ 
Section 1338 in turn vests exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts over cases 
which ‘arise under’ the patent laws.”) 
177
 Donald R. Dunner, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Its 
Critical Role in the Revitalization of the U.S. Patent Jurisprudence, Past, 
Present, and Future, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 777 (2010) (“At the same time, 
however, we noted a significant problem. At that time, appellate review of patent 
cases litigated in the many district courts around the United States took place in 
eleven different circuit courts of appeals, depending on the geographic location 
of the district courts. Because those circuit courts had widely varying views of 
the patent laws--some very friendly to patents and some very hostile to them--
lawyers handling patent cases engaged in mad and undignified races to the 
courthouses of their choice in order to position their clients in the circuit most 
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patent holder faced uncertainty as to the application of patent law because it 
might be sued by a potential defendant under the declaratory judgment statute in 
any circuit, or a case that it brought in a circuit of its choosing might be 
transferred to another venue upon a successful motion by the defendant.
178
  
The legislative history makes clear that Congress hoped that the 
consolidation of all patent appeals in one circuit court would both standardize the 
law that the district courts are required to apply to patent cases,
179
 and allow more 
expert review of patent appeals by a specialized court with the ability to hire 
specialized, often scientifically trained, clerks.
180
  
Most commentators agree that since its creation, the Federal Circuit has 
indeed acted in accordance with Congress’s desire that the Court increase 
uniformity in patent law.
181
 In fact, the Court very quickly began moving toward 
 
friendly to their clients’ interests. The end result was an extremely inefficient and 
unfair administration of justice in the patent law area, not to mention the total 
unpredictability of patent jurisprudence, contingent on who reached the 
courthouse first.”) While horizontal inconsistency among circuits is a common 
feature of the United States court system, the drafters of the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act seemed to think that the cost of inconsistency was particularly 
great when it came to patent law due to the national scope of the production and 
use of patented goods.  
178
 Although in practice declaratory judgment actions and transfers of venue 
were not common. 
179
 See Hale, supra note 42. 
180
 Lee, supra note 170 at 19 (“Furthermore, while Federal Circuit judges 
routinely employ scientifically trained clerks, it is highly unlikely that district 
judges would prioritize this attribute in hiring decisions.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging 
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068 (2003) (“Federal Circuit judges are also assisted by 
a small technical staff and by law clerks who generally have both legal training 
and some technical background.”) There is also evidence that at least some of the 
proponents of the Act instituting the Federal Circuit hoped that the Court would 
prove to be more favorably inclined to protecting and enforcing patent rights, 
especially given that in some circuits prior to the act the rates of invalidation of 
patents had become quite high. 
181
 John Donofrio et al., Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.: The 
Application of Federal Question Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction 
Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1835, 1837 (1996) (“Congress created the Federal 
Circuit, in part, to unify the application of the patent laws.”); Paul C. Craane, At 
the Boundaries of Law and Equity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 105, 109 (1992) (“In 1982, 
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bright-line rules that, because of the Court’s unique situation as the only circuit 
court hearing patent law cases, were particularly effective in providing 
nationwide inconsistency reduction.
182
 Bright line rules are predictable, and much 
easier to apply than standards in horizontally and vertically consistent ways. 
Thus, the Federal Circuit’s actual and perceived special mandate does seem to 
have some explanatory power in discussing its preference bright line rules. 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is used to operating within the 
historic federal court system within which horizontal inconsistency among the 
circuit courts—and thus district courts—is the norm. While part of the Supreme 
Court’s mandate is to provide some horizontal and vertical consistency by 
 
Congress created a new federal circuit court of appeals to unify the field of patent 
law.”)  
The Federal Circuit also emphasized rules that avoided making it unduly 
difficult for patent applicants to get patents. For instance, the Federal Circuit has 
consistently warned against hindsight bias in deciding issues of obviousness. See 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 375, 378 (2008) (“The Federal Circuit has quite explicitly deployed the 
TSM approach to guard against the “hindsight trap” that makes a new invention 
seem obvious once an examiner or trial court knows what it is, even though the 
same invention might not have been obvious at the time it was made to an 
evaluator who only knew the prior art and was not yet aware of the inventor’s 
further contribution.”); Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experiment 
Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 
YALE J. L. & TECH 1 (2007) (“Similarly, the Federal Circuit . . . has strived for 
years to reduce or eliminate the impact of hindsight on patent decisions.”). 
 
182 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What 
Ought We to Expect?, 43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 827, 835 (2010) (“Of course, the 
Supreme Court does not face the expertise asymmetry with which 
the Federal Circuit must contend. And there is enough disarray in other federal 
regimes to suggest that the Supreme Court might, at least on occasion, take a 
page out of the Federal Circuit’s playbook and attend to the 
difficulties lower courts will face when applying its law.”); LeRoy L. Kondo, 
Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through Specialization for 
Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2002) (“The Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo may have been calculated to 
diminish the level of uncertainty of adjudication among the 
generalist lower courts resulting from this doctrine through erection of an easily 
applied “bright-line” standard. Certainly, indeterminancy in interpretation of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents in patent claims has led to increased uncertainty among 
the lower courts.”). 
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settling disputed legal questions, it has neither the inclination nor the capacity to 
drive out anything near all of the horizontal inconsistency in the system. Thus, 
the Supreme Court has historically been comfortable with a large amount of 
vertical and horizontal inconsistency and has focused on crafting “correct” 
decisions as to particularly thorny or disputed legal questions.
183
 This difference 
in focus helps explain why the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled against the 
Federal Circuit’s adoption of bright line rules that the Court considered to be a 
source of a great deal of manifest errors in patent law.
184
 
B. The Federal Circuit’s Specialized Role As Sole Federal Appellate 
Court For Patent Cases 
Another possible reason for the Federal Circuit’s embrace of rules as 
compared to the Supreme Court’s embrace of standards is closely related to 
consideration of the Federal Circuit’s special mandate, yet distinct. Even if the 
Federal Circuit were not influenced by the legislative history and apparent 
Congressional intent that the Federal Circuit should make patent law more 
uniform nationwide, the fact that the Federal Circuit has the unique appellate role 
of deciding patent appeals from every district court in the United States may 
create its own pressure for the uniformity that comes from bright-line rules.  
Even if the Federal Circuit does not interpret the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982 as a mandate to make patent law more uniform, the 
fact that every Federal Circuit decision applies to every district court in the 
United States means that every district court must attempt to apply the Federal 
Circuit’s case law. With so many courts applying the Federal Circuit’s case law, 
amorphous interpretations are likely to be applied in a wide variety of ways. 
These varieties of interpretations are then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which 
must rule on the correctness of each application of its rule. If the Federal Circuit 
adopts highly contextual standards rather than bright line rules, then it must rule 
on the correctness of each district court decision by engaging in a detailed 
examination of the district court’s application of the relevant standard. Thus 
 
183
 Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 861 (1994) (“When is superior court self-
correction desirable, and what role should inferior courts play in encouraging it? 
To answer the first question, we must distinguish between the values of (a) the 
superior court’s divining the “best” rule when first addressing a legal issue and 
(b) the court’s “correcting” or improving an initially misguided answer.”). 
184
 Although beyond the scope of this article, the inconsistency robustness 
paradigm provides a good tool for investigating whether the pattern identified 
here—the Supreme Court’s regular rejection of bright-line rules from the Federal 
Circuit—plays out in the Supreme Court’s relationship with the other circuit 
courts. 
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standards, while allowing great flexibility in decision making, present two main 
drawbacks due the significant contextual component that characterizes them: 
inconsistent rulings and time intensiveness of rulings. In short, deciding to adopt 
standards costs the Federal Circuit not just in terms of opening the Court to 
charges of unpredictability in patent law, but also by directly and exponentially 
increasing the Court’s workload per case. This provides the Federal Circuit an 
additional motive to move towards bright-line rules. 
Such a motivation is not present for the Supreme Court because it only 
hears cases by granting certiorari. This means that the Supreme Court is only 
marginally involved with the “aftermath” of lower courts’ applications of 
standards after the Court adopts them. Thus, the Supreme Court internalizes 
much less of the drawbacks associated with the adoption of standards than the 
Federal Circuit does. We will come back to this point later in the paper. 
C. The Federal Circuit’s Specialized Knowledge (Capture?) versus 
Supreme Court’s Generalized Approach 
A third possible explanation for why the Federal Circuit regularly 
chooses rules while the Supreme Court regularly chooses standards in patent law 
is that the Federal Circuit has greater specialized knowledge in this field and, 
consequently, better understanding of how certain solutions affect patent owners, 
prosecutors, lawyers, litigants, industries, and the economy. The Federal Circuit 
certainly has more experience with the parties directly affected by patents than 
does the Supreme Court. For one thing, many Federal Circuit judges had patent 
law experience before they became judges.
185
 Given this, it may be that the 
Federal Circuit repeatedly crafts plain rules because it has reason to believe, 
based on its specialized knowledge, that they will be more administrable and 
workable for the patent community.  
In contrast to the Federal Circuit’s “specialized approach,” the Supreme 
Court uses its “generalized approach” in patent cases, i.e. it uses the approach 
that it has developed from dealing with cases related to all areas of law. While 
patent law mostly applies to sophisticated parties, in many other areas of law, 
 
185
 Jacob Birnbaum, The Case for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s 
Adoption of an Open-Source “Bounty” System for Reviewing Business Method 
and Software Patents in Light of the Patent Infringement Battles Featuring the 
U.S. Financial Exchanges That Have Been Waged in Recent Years, 2006 UCLA 
J. L. & TECH. 2, 21 (2006) (“Unlike other appellate courts judges, many Federal 
Circuit judges had prior experience as patent attorneys.”); Lee Petherbridge, 
Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 452 (2009)  (“Finally, a 
number of Federal Circuit judges have substantial pre-appointment practice 
experience in patent law, while others do not.”). 
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legal rules or standards affect both sophisticated and unsophisticated groups.
186
 
This could result in the Supreme Court being “in general” more comfortable with 
standards than rules because they are flexible and, thus, are easier to applied to 
protect the unsophisticated.
187
 Under this possible explanation, if the Federal 
Circuit really does have more expertise and is correct that the patent community 
is sophisticated and can better adapt to plain rules, then the Supreme Court 
should probably be more careful in considering whether the Court of Appeal’s 
strategy is appropriate or not in the specific context. 
On the other hand, it could be that rather than applying greater expertise, 
both the Patent Office and the Federal Circuit are victims of a form of agency 
capture.
188
 The Federal Circuit’s closeness to patent practitioners and patent 
owners could make it unwittingly favor the interest of the patent community 
members that it knows best—patent lawyers at prestigious firms and big 
companies that can afford to litigate patent suits. If this is the case and the 
Federal Circuit is crafting rules that help these members of the patent community 
at the expense of other members (say start ups who fall victim to patent thickets 
or non-patent holders who want to build commercial products but are blocked by 
obvious patents), then the Supreme Court’s scrutiny of the Court of Appeal’s 
choice of tools to operate in this field, is essential. 
D. Differing Assumptions about Transaction Costs in Patent 
Disputes 
Another possible explanation for the difference in approach to rules 
versus standards by the two courts relates to whether the Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court have divergent assumptions on the transaction costs of using, 
negotiating, and clearing patents. It may be that the Federal Circuit is 
comfortable adopting bright-line rules in certain patent law cases when it 
believes that even if the rule results in an inefficient allocation of property rights, 
transaction costs are low enough that parties can bargain around these rules to 
 
186
 Tort law, insurance law, administrative law, property law, and contracts 
are a few examples. 
187
 More investigation that goes beyond the scope of this paper is necessary 
on this point. In particular, a comparative study of the Supreme Court’s approach 
in other areas of law would benefit from analysis informed by the inconsistency 
robustness paradigm. 
188
 This is also known as “regulatory capture,” and occurs when a regulated 
industry (for example, airlines or the FDA) has a far larger stake in regulatory 
decisions than any other group. The regulated companies then spend a large sum 
of money on lobbyists and lawyers and soon turn the regulatory process to their 
advantage. See Timothy B. Lee, Entangling the Web, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2011, 
11:03 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/03/opinion /03lee.html. 
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efficient outcomes. The Coase Theorem teaches that if transaction costs are low, 
it does not matter to whom a property right is assigned, so long as there is a clear 
assignment of the right.
 189
 With low transaction costs, parties will bargain so that 
the party who values the particular resource the most, ends up with the property 
right.  
This approach is a bit of a one-way ratchet, however, because only 
improperly granted patent rights can be bargained around. If the Federal Circuit 
adopts bright-line rules that result in negating patents that should have issued or 
been held valid, that destroys incentives to innovate or commercialize inventions 
in a way that obviously cannot be bargained around.
190
 And indeed, if we look at 
the five areas of patent law discussed in Part III; we see that the Federal Circuit 
did not create any bright-line rules that will negate patent grants or validity even 
if the rules are over or under inclusive. 
Three of the five areas discussed in Part III in which the Federal Circuit 
created bright-line rules obviously were beneficial to patent owners, and thus 
created property rights that, if they were incorrectly allocated, must depend on 
low costs of reallocation for efficient functioning of the system. First, the Federal 
Circuit’s strict TSM test for obviousness resulted in more patents being held 
valid. Second, the Court’s strict standard for alleging standing to assert a 
declaratory judgment case against a patent owner affected the timing and ability 
to bring declaratory judgment actions, but did not affect the substantive rules for 
determining whether a particular patent is valid. Third, the Court’s near-
automatic issuance of injunctions in patent cases created property remedies for 
property right violations, and thus gave patentees stronger positions vis a vis 
infringers.  
 
189
 The Coase Theorem describes the economic efficiency of an economic 
outcome in the presence of externalities.  If trade in an externality is possible and 
there are no transaction costs, bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome 
regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. See generally R. H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
190
 There is also a social cost in the form of higher prices for products 
covered by patents that carry market power. This cost is deemed worthwhile to 
the extent that it is more than offset by increased innovation. To the extent that 
the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rules create patent rights where the cost in terms 
of monopoly loss is greater than the benefit of increased innovation, even low 
transaction costs do not solve this problem. But so long as transaction costs are 
low, innovation should occur and property rights should be efficiently 
reallocated, even if in some cases they are rights that should not have been 
granted and the result in some allocative inefficiency and in consumers paying 
more. 
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In the two other areas of patent law discussed in Part III—the doctrine of 
equivalents and patentable subject matter—the Federal Circuit created bright line 
rules that limited patent holders’ rights. These rules operate to limit the scope of 
patent rights (DOE) and to limit the types of innovation for which patents can be 
granted (PSM). Because these rules restrict patent rights rather than reallocate 
them, they cannot be bargained around. In other words, reallocation of rights is 
not possible when a patent is not issued or a broadening of a claim is not 
available. Rather, these rules serve to limit property rights. Obviously rights that 
do not exist cannot be reallocated and thus, there are no transaction costs to 
discuss in those situations. But the Federal Circuit may believe that any harmful 
affect of its rules on patent holders can be largely avoided.  
The Court’s absolute bar to the doctrine of equivalents in Festo did not 
invalidate patents, but instead simply disallowed claiming infringement beyond 
the literal scope of the claims in those instances in which the patentee amended 
her patent during prosecution. Because patent prosecutors have become very 
sophisticated about writing claims, and because many claims are not amended, 
the additional rights for patent owners that were destroyed by the rule were likely 
less significant, and to some extent avoidable going forward. Thus, the Court 
may have determined that the potential losses to patent incentives from the rule 
were outweighed by the increased certainty it provided. And the increased 
certainty in itself helps to make patent value more determinable and thus lowers 
information costs in transactions concerning patent rights. 
The Federal Circuit’s machine or transformation test likewise restricted 
the universe of innovation subject to patenting. Under the Court’s rule, processes 
that were neither tied to a machine nor resulted in a physical transformation were 
unpatentable. This was obviously not something that could be bargained around 
because there was no right over which to bargain. Rather, the Court in effect 
created null rights. Thus, like the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule restricting 
certain applications of the Doctrine of Equivalents, its bright-line rule restricting 
patentable subject matter could not have grown out of a thought that the rule 
could be bargained around if it is overly broad. Rather, here again the Court 
seems to have thought that the decrease in innovation and commercialization 
incentive was likely to be slight in comparison to the certainty accompanying the 
rule and the other benefits of limiting patentable subject matter in this way. 
Accordingly, we see that if transaction costs are low enough, bright-line 
patent rules having to do with the allocation of patent rights rather than with 
negating them appear to be most efficient because, in addition to creating 
predictability and consistency, where the lower-value user is granted the property 
right by patent law, other interested parties will simply be able to bargain to the 
efficient re-allocation. 
Thus, it could be that, in the context of the patent law, the Federal Circuit 
is comfortable creating bright-line rules that favor patent rights because it 
believes that transaction costs are low enough that even numerous and 
overlapping weak or bad patents can be cleared by those seeking to make 
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products supposedly covered by them. Thus, bright-line rules should be preferred 
over standards in these cases.  
If the Supreme Court, however, believes that transaction costs are high 
when it comes to patents,
191
 then bright-line rules will result in inefficient results 
whenever their application rewards the lower-value user with the patent. This is 
because, in these cases, “autonomous” re-allocation of rights by interested parties 
is close to impossible. Specifically, the Supreme Court may be worried that 
patent thickets
192
 or other inefficient results associated with high transaction 
costs, will occur if courts don’t get the questions of patent validity and 
infringement “right” in the first place.193 Thus, standards rather than bright-line 
rules should be adopted, because they determine fewer manifest errors and, 
consequently, less need for “autonomous” reallocations of rights.  
Why might the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court have different views 
on transaction costs in the patent system? This could be the result of the different 
opinions of the individuals on the two courts. Or it could be that the Federal 
Circuit, in dealing with mainly patent cases, is regularly in the mindset of 
business and professional transactions and, in that role, has concluded that 
transaction costs often can be overcome. 
A variant of this explanation could be that the Federal Circuit may 
believe that the incentive given by bright-line patent rules to create and 
commercialize is important enough and significant enough that it outweighs any 
thicket effects or hold-up problems from non-practicing patent holders, while the 
Supreme Court believes the opposite, and thus thinks standards are needed to 
both prevent bad patents from issuing and from being found valid and infringed.  
 
191
 Transaction costs might be high due to patent thickets, uncertainty as to 
claim scope, or because the systems for negotiating licenses and adjudicating 
disputes is expensive, for instance. 
192
 For a discussion of patent thickets, see, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The Rise and 
Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 
1850’s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (2011); Michael J. Meurer, Business Method 
Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 309 (2002). 
193
 eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, concurring) (“An industry has developed 
in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.  For these firms, an injunction, and 
the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses 
to practice the patent.”) 
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E. Differing Views on What System Creates Optimal Inconsistency 
Robustness Drives the Two Courts to Disagree as to Rules v. 
Standards. 
This Part presents a final and, we believe, more persuasive explanation 
for the divergent approach to rules versus standards in patent law taken by the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. The previous parts offered explanations 
for why the Federal Circuit tends to favor bright-line rules in patent law. Some of 
these explanations have to do with the Federal Circuit’s unique position as the 
sole circuit court of appeals for all patent cases. But if the Federal Circuit’s 
unique position encourages it to move toward bright-line rules, why does the 
Supreme Court, as the sole final arbiter of all patent law, not seem to have the 
same incentives and equally embrace bright-line rules for patent law?  
We believe that the explanation may be that the attractions and defects of 
inconsistency reduction together with the related costs and benefits, looks 
different to each court in this area. In other words, the perceived costs and 
benefits of different approaches to horizontal and vertical inconsistency reduction 
and to error correction in legal decisions vary by position of the system 
administer. Thus, if the system designer thinks of administering the system 
sporadically, from the top, as the Supreme Court does, this gives a different 
perspective on the optimal standards for the system than that of the system 
designer who thinks of administering the system from the “middle”, as the 
Federal Circuit does. For the highly involved “middle manager” system 
administrator, the optimal standards for the system seem quite different.  
The Supreme Court not only administers the system from the top, but it 
has discretionary certiorari power, so it can choose which patent appeals to hear, 
and indeed, hears very few patent appeals.
194
 This feature means that the 
Supreme Court can focus on creating standards that allow trial courts to get the 
“best” answers to legal and factual patent questions, and that allow the Federal 
Circuit any needed leeway to correct trial court decisions that, when considered 
in full context, may be considered “erroneous.” These are decisions, for instance, 
that apply the correct rule and thus, strictly speaking, are correct, but because of 
the special circumstances of the case do not achieve the most desirable result and 
leave a sense that something – perhaps, the rule itself - is “wrong.” The obvious 
reaction is that, in these cases, standards are preferable, but at what cost? The 
Supreme Court can create standards and leave them to the Federal Circuit and 
 
194
 Note that while the Supreme Court has accepted certiorari on more patent 
cases in the last decade than in the previous decades of the Federal Circuit’s 
existence, it still accepts relatively few patent cases per year, by necessity. John 
M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription For 
Appellate Review Of Questions In Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 657, 667 
(2009). 
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trial courts to apply, even at the cost of greater horizontal and vertical 
inconsistency. As we briefly mentioned in Part IV.B, the Supreme Court, because 
of its certiorari power, internalizes very little of the “aftermath” of the adoption 
of standards and, thus, perceives the benefit of more “correct” application of 
patent law to be greater.  
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, operates within a system that 
gives every patent litigant an appeal as of right. Thus, the Federal Circuit must 
rule on every appeal and bear the full cost of applying any difficult standards that 
the Supreme Court adopts. The Federal Circuit bears the costs of horizontal and 
vertical inconsistency more directly than the Supreme Court in another way as 
well. Because the Federal Circuit must hear every appeal, it regularly and directly 
experiences the “discomfort” that comes with the adoption of standards. While 
standards promote contextual application of the law, they also create mental 
uncertainty and exhaustion that is unpleasant to most decision makers.
195
 This is 
because of the large amount of discretion necessary for their administration and 
the pressure created by issuing decisions that the decision maker perceives to be 
uncertain as to correct result.
196
 In addition, deciding so many patent cases on 
 
195
 See Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889, 6889  (2011) (“Sequential choices and the 
apparent mental depletion that they evoke also increase people’s tendency to 
simplify decision by accepting the status quo. … [R]epeated rulings can increase 
the likelihood of judges to simplify their decisions.”  Participants in a study who 
were asked to both determine their desired computer features and then go through 
the process of selecting those features in an online form experienced more fatigue 
than participants who only analyzed the desired features or who entered 
predetermined specifications into the form.  “They had to cast the die, and that 
turned out to be the most fatiguing task of all.”); John Tierney, Do You Suffer 
from Decision Fatigue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-fatigue 
(Judges in a study were more likely to deny defendant’s parole request when 
fatigued to preserve the status quo, eliminate recidivism risk, and retain future 
sentencing options.); Kent Greenfield, THE MYTH OF CHOICE 50 (2011) 
(Subjects in a study asked to remember a seven digit number, given a choice of 
dessert or fruit, were less able to resist dessert than subjects asked to remember a 
one digit number.). But see Greenfield, supra at 173 (“The law’s vagueness can 
have surprising benefits. Gray areas force decision makers to look at the nuances 
and particularities of situation before issuing legal edicts or making 
determinations of blame.”). 
196
 Note that also here the problem of achieving the “correct” result is 
present. In the case of adoption of bright-line rules the problem is produced by 
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shifting panel assignments may make Federal Circuit judges aware of how the 
specific judges sitting on a panel may have more to do with predicting a case’s 
outcome than the standard being applied.
197
 This knowledge too can be 
uncomfortable to a judge, who, notwithstanding an appreciation of legal 
realism,
198
 generally wishes to be able to say that her/his decisions were 
grounded in a statute rather than in policy preference.
199
  
 
the fact that “one size does not fit all,” whereas here the problem is produced by 
the discretion given to the decision maker. 
197
 See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals Over Time, 64 POL. RES. Q. 377, 377 (2011) ( “Given varying 
preferences among the judges in a circuit, and the fact that a panel decision 
represents the views of a majority of three judges, the assignment of judges to a 
particular panel may increase the probability of a certain outcome.”); see also 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
831, 837 (“New Legal Realists describe the impact of [ideological preferences of 
]the colleagues on an appellate panel on a judge’s own votes as ‘peer effects’ or 
‘panel effects.’”); see also Greenfield, supra note 184 at 69 (“On the one hand, 
influences are only that. They do not dictate behavior, and their effects can be 
moderated merely by our knowing they exist. On the other hand, our brains are 
pre-programmed to think and feel in certain ways, and it takes the analytical 
reflexive, and emotional parts of our brains all working together to give us a 
fighting chance at making good decisions. … Instead of assuming that everyone 
is completely responsible for his or her decisions, we’d be better off recognizing 
the complexity of choice, in law and politics and life.  … We’d be more likely to 
recognize the limitations we face and the constraints on our decisions, and be 
better able to prepare for the times when decisions really do need to be made 
well.”).  
198
 See Miles, supra n. 197 at 834 (“A distinguishing feature of the New 
Legal Realism is the close examination of reported cases in order to understand 
how judicial personality, understood in various ways, influences legal outcomes, 
and how legal institutions constrain or unleash these influences.” “For [Karl] 
Llewellyn, the indeterminacy, sometimes even incoherence, of law meant that 
‘the personality of the judge’ must to some degree explain case outcomes. In his 
view, ‘our government is not a government of laws, but one of laws through 
men.”); Danziger, supra n. 195 at 6889(“Legal realists argue that the rational 
application of legal reasons does not sufficiently explain the decisions of judges 
and that psychological, political, and social factors influence judicial ruling.”). 
199
 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 8 (2008) (“No responsible 
student of the judicial system supposes that “politics” . . . or personal 
idiosyncrasy drives most decisions, except in the Supreme Court, which indeed is 
largely a political court when it is deciding constitutional cases. Legalism drives 
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In addition to any cognitive discomfort created by regularly applying 
amorphous rules and witnessing increased levels of inconsistency, contextual 
standards also create more work for the Federal Circuit, in that they, by their 
nature, involve more detailed investigations. New institutional economics teaches 
us that, all other things being equal, an institution will prefer less work to more 
work.
200
 Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the Federal Circuit would dislike 
standards that greatly increase its workload. But even if Federal Circuit judges do 
not consider the impact of the standards in the form of increased workload, they 
have a selfless, inconsistency robust motivation to seek reduced workloads. 
Simply put, widespread adoption of standards creates more work per case, which, 
when it reaches a critical mass, results in inadequate time available per case.
201
 
Inadequate time per case must result in both more hurried opinions that are of 
less use to litigants and those seeking to keep abreast of the Federal Circuit’s 
decisions, as well as poorer quality opinions. Thus, for both self-regarding and 
 
most judicial decisions, though generally they are the less important ones for the 
development of legal doctrine or the impact on society.”). See generally, Edmund 
Ursin, How Great Judges Think: Judges Richard Posner, Henry Friendly, and 
Roger Traynor on Judicial Lawmaking, 57 BUFF L. REV. 1267, 1328, 1330 
(2009) (a “wise judge will try to check his convictions against those of some 
broader community of opinion.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 911-12 (2003). 
200
 See Davide Dragone, I’m Getting Tired: Effort and Fatigue in 
Intertemporal Decision Making, 552 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 552, 552 (2009) (“[In 
economics] the cost of exerting effort is formalized by assuming that the agent 
does not like working, i.e. that exerting effort yields disutility, and that the agent 
will exert effort on the task only if appropriately motivated.”). 
201
 One way to deal with decreased time per case is to decide a number of 
cases in unpublished, non-precedential decisions. This allows a more hurried 
application of the law in individual cases, with less collateral damage caused to 
other litigants from any mistakes that are made. The Federal Circuit currently 
uses unpublished opinions to decide a significant number of cases. While 
unpublished opinions do not create precedent, and thus do not provide increased 
clarity as to patent law, deciding a number of cases in a non-precedential way can 
be inconsistency robust if doing so keeps any possible error in the unpublished 
decisions from conflicting with published decisions. Thus, even if unpublished 
decisions are decided in ways that are horizontally or vertically inconsistent, by 
segmenting these cases from the official, precedential body of patent law, the 
Federal Circuit promotes and retains formal, official consistency. Allowing 
inconsistency in some areas to preserve consistency in other, more important 
areas is a fully inconsistency robust approach to systems designs. See supra, Part 
II. 
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selfless reasons, the Federal Circuit’s evaluation of what a cost-beneficial 
inconsistency robust system of patent law should be will differ from the Supreme 
Court’s in favor of more bright-line rules. Thus we see that what looks like a 
nicely inconsistency robust system to the Supreme Court looks to the Federal 
Circuit like a system in which the benefit of decreased inconsistency is 
significantly greater than the cost. The Federal Circuit thus naturally attempts to 
reduce the inconsistency by applying more bright-line rules.  
Of course, all courts of appeals have some motivation to choose rules 
over standards to decrease their workloads, but three factors increase the Federal 
Circuit’s incentive and ability to choose bright-line rules, as compared to other 
circuit courts. First, the Federal Circuit must hear all patent appeals from the 
entire country. Thus, the Federal Circuit experiences more costs from standards, 
and more benefit from rules than an average circuit court of general 
jurisdiction.
202
 Second, a bright-line rule in patent law can significantly decrease 
the complexity of appeals for the Federal Circuit, since a great deal of their cases 
are patent cases.
203
 Contrarily, for other appellate courts, any particular bright-
line rule is less likely to significantly decrease the complexity of a large number 
of appeals, because they hear cases in so many areas of law.
204
 Third, because the 
 
202
 The Federal Circuit has 1,102 cases currently pending to date within the 
last twelve months as of 10/01/11. Year-to-Date Activity and Status of Pending 
Appeals, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (Nov. 
14, 2011) (http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/YTD 
_Activity_and_Status_of_Pending_Appeals_10.28.2011.pdf). The U.S. Courts of 
Appeals had 44,440 cases pending from a period of March 2010 to March 2011 
throughout all circuits (excluding the Federal Circuit). The majority of these 
arose in the Ninth Circuit, which has 13,913 cases as of March 2011. The First, 
Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit all have less than 1,500 cases 
pending in each circuit. U.S. Court of Appeals-Appeals Commenced, Terminated, 
and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending March 31, 2010 and 2011, 
UNITED STATE COURTS (Nov. 14, 2011) 
(http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialC
aseloadStatistics/2011/tables/B00Mar11.pdf). 
203
 Intellectual Property disputes make up 45% of the cases that the Federal 
Circuit will hear in 2011.  Appeals Filed, by Category, UNITED STATE COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (Nov. 14, 2011) 
(http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/Caseload_by_ 
category_2011.pdf).  
204
 Kent S. Scheideggar, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative 
Power, 98 COLUM, L. REV. 888, 932 (1998) (“Second, the characteristic of the 
circuit court that made its judgment binding was not its status as an Article III 
court but rather its status as a court of general jurisdiction.”). 
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Federal Circuit is the only circuit court for patent appeals, it can choose bright-
line rules without conflicting with other circuits. This decreases the cost of 
choosing bright line rules in two ways. Number one, no one can argue that 
another circuit has a superior rule. Number two, the knowledge that the rule will 
be applied by all district courts and will thus be uniform decreases comparisons 
and also lets the Federal Circuit think it is making things easier for all district 
courts. 
V. Lessons the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Can Learn from the 
Inconsistency Robustness Paradigm 
To make the best decisions on what rules should govern patent litigation 
issues, and to decrease the likelihood of continued reversals by the Supreme 
Court, the Federal Circuit should recognize the different way in which the 
Supreme Court approaches inconsistency robustness in the United States federal 
court system. Understanding that the Supreme Court is likely to focus more on 
manifest error than vertical and horizontal inconsistency can help the Federal 
Circuit predict when the Supreme Court is likely to overturn a legal rule crafted 
by the Federal Circuit. Thus, the Federal Circuit should exercise restraint in 
driving towards its goal of certainty and inconsistency reduction. The Federal 
Circuit should realize that if it makes rules that are too bright-lined, the Supreme 
Court will likely overturn them because the Supreme Court’s view of the patent 
legal system and of administering it is a view from the top, without as much 
focus on the burdens that contextual standards place on the mid-level system 
administrators—in this case, the Federal Circuit. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court would do well to remember that 
when it reverses patent appeals from the Federal Circuit, it is reversing not just 
the law in one geographic area of the United States, but rather is reversing the 
law nationwide. In evaluating the benefit of crafting standards that allow for the 
review of lower court decisions according to multivariate criteria, the Supreme 
Court should remember that the cost of this nuanced review is overturning a high 
degree of horizontal and vertical consistency that the Federal Circuit has 
established nationwide. The Supreme Court should attempt to view the system 
not just from its own perspective, but also from the perspective of the Federal 
Circuit as an important administrator of the patent system. This should lead the 
Supreme Court to give greater deference to the judgment of the Federal Circuit as 
to the importance of vertical and horizontal consistency versus capacity for error 
reduction in the realm of patent law. It may be that the Federal Circuit’s greater 
experience day in and day out with patent cases and patent litigants gives the 
Federal Circuit particular expertise in judging how to balance the elimination and 
allowance of inconsistencies so as to arrive at the best level of inconsistency 
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robustness management in service of the values of the legal system in the unique 
area of patent law.
205
 
Thus, there may be times when a properly nuanced vision of the 
inconsistency robustness paradigm with respect to the court system would 
encourage the Supreme Court to consider the costs in terms of inconsistency and 
predictability of correcting error in Federal Circuit opinions. On the other hand 
there may be times when the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rules have greater 
benefits to society in terms of predictability and consistency of application than 
nuanced standards that allow for reducing manifest error at the cost of 
inconsistency and unpredictability.
206
  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Festo v. Shoketsu207 seems a good 
example of the Court acting in accordance with a holistic view of inconsistency 
robustness in patent law.
208
 The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s bright-line 
rule that the doctrine of equivalents is unavailable as to a particular claim once a 
 
205
 Lee, supra note 46 at 42 (“Actors in the patent system reduce information 
costs in a number of surprising ways. Historically, the Supreme Court has done 
so by largely deferring to the Federal Circuit on patent matters. For a long period 
after the Federal Circuit’s establishment in 1982, the Supreme Court rarely 
reviewed that court’s patent opinions. In the first ten years of the Federal 
Circuit’s existence, the Supreme Court only reviewed three patent decisions. In a 
sense, this paucity of Supreme Court review reflected deference to the Federal 
Circuit’s expert authority.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of 
Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 787, 808 (2008) (“Although the Supreme Court takes too few cases in most 
areas of federal law to become expert, it can normally rely on the experience 
gained from seeing how the differing rules of the regional circuits play out. But 
because of the Federal Circuit, there is no occasion for differing rules in patent 
law. Given these difficulties, it might be expected that the Supreme Court would 
defer to the Federal Circuit’s expert judgment on issues of law. (Or, to put things 
another way, one might have thought that the Federal Circuit’s unique placement 
in the judicial hierarchy was intended to reduce the need for Supreme Court 
attention.)”). 
206
 Computer scientists often address issues by going to a higher level of 
abstraction. Their approach is to go to a higher level of abstraction that gets 
around the problem or inconsistency. In this way, computer scientists build more 
inconsistency robust systems. Is there an analogous phenomenon in the law? 
Probably yes. The law often reasons at a higher level of abstraction so as to 
divide factual or legal decisions consistently. Bright-line rules, to function, must 
be built at a higher level of abstraction. 
207
 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002). 
208
 See supra notes 102-110, and accompanying text. 
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patentee once the patentee has amended a claim.
209
 But the Supreme Court 
replaced the Federal Circuit’s rule with one that allowed a bit more flexibility, 
yet remains easy to administer and easy to maintain horizontal and vertical 
consistency.
210
 The Supreme Court’s replacement rule is that the doctrine of 
equivalents is unavailable once a patentee has amended a claim, except as to 
unforeseeable equivalents that the patentee could not have literally claimed at the 
time of amendment. This decision of the Supreme Court is an example of the 
Court crafting an inconsistency robust system at all levels. The Court corrected 
an excessive narrowness of the Federal Circuit—patentees should not be 
foreclosed from claiming unforeseeable equivalents simply because they amend 
their claims—but the Court did so via a rule that is easy to administer and that 
maintains consistency at a fairly low cost. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR v. Teleflex,211 however, seems to 
be an example of the Court failing to consider creating inconsistency robustness 
from multiple perspectives.
212
 In KSR, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
bright-line TSM rule for obviousness and instead insisted that the Federal Circuit 
return to the highly contextual standard for obviousness with which the Federal 
Circuit had struggled for years until it adopted the more administrable and 
consistent TSM test.
213
 The Supreme Court’s decision did indeed allow more 
flexibility to determine the obviousness of patents, but at extremely high cost in 
terms of certainty and predictability of patent validity, and in terms of confidence 
in district and appellate court decisions as to obviousness. Had the Court taken a 
view of the patent law system from the perspective of the Federal Circuit as a 
system administrator, and from the perspective of market participants who rely 
on information about patent validity in conducting their business, it should have 
attempted a solution that did not sacrifice so much certainty, predictability, and 
consistency for the benefit of nuanced obviousness determinations. 
VI. Conclusion 
This Article has applied insights from the new paradigm of inconsistency 
robustness to both identify and analyze the consistent difference in approach to 
rules versus standards that exists between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court on the subject of patent law. This Article described the inconsistency 
robustness paradigm, and explained how legal systems in general function in 
accordance with it, i.e. legal systems must be inconsistency robust to function. 
The Article then gave five examples of substantive areas in patent law in which 
 
209
 Id. 
210
 Id. 
211
 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007). 
212
 See supra notes 84-101, and accompanying text. 
213
 Id. 
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the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court have divided over rules versus standards. 
The Article showed a recurring pattern in which the Federal Circuit gravitates 
towards bright-line rules that are eventually overturned by the Supreme Court 
and replaced by contextual standards. The Article then discussed possible reasons 
for this repeated divide, including explanations utilizing the inconsistency 
robustness paradigm to show that each court is engaged in designing what it sees 
as the optimally inconsistency robust system of patent law. This article also 
shows, however, that because of these two courts’ different positions, and 
consequent different way in which they experience costs and benefits of 
inconsistency reduction, they repeatedly and predictably differ as to their views 
of what tools should be adopted to achieve the optimally inconsistency robust 
patent law system. Finally, this Article explains that acknowledging the 
difference in costs and benefits to rules versus standards for the two courts is 
necessary to design a truly inconsistency robust patent law system—a system in 
which the level of inconsistency and error correction is optimized for the benefit 
of all players.  
